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ABSTRACT
Managing nuclear power plant aging is one of the important
technical issues which needs to be addressed by utilities in order to
extend the operating life of some of the early LWR power stations.
Plant managers must understand complex aging phenomena, identify aging
effects, anticipate failure, and mitigate the aging process.
Typically, the age-related design limits of crucial components are
not known, and this information usually does not appear to be easily
available from the equipment vendor. Electrical cables, insulation and
instrumentation are most susceptible to age-related degradation.
material degradation due to corrosion is the main costly problem
affecting a small but important portion of piping and major equipment.
Upgrading the plant, replacing aging equipment, and implementing
good maintenance, surveillance and spare parts inventory control
programs are actions a utility can take to extend the life of operating
nuclear plants.
Considerable institutional uncertainties are associated with
nuclear plant life extension. These spring mainly from the absence of
clearly defined policies by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
stating the technical and procedural requirements for plant life
extension.
From precedents established to-date, it is reasonable to expect
plant operation to be permitted for most plants for a total of 40 years
after start of commerical operation. As a large share of the net
discounted benefits of extended life operation may be derived from the
first decade of additional life, the basis for utility investments for
life extension is thus assured.
-i-
In planning for life extensions beyond ten years it is useful to
consider that the plant would be operated into the future indefinitely,
and that it should be maintained so as to maximize efficiency and
safety.
-ii-
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
By the year 2000, eight commercial nuclear power plants will be
approaching the expiration date of their operating licenses. When a
nuclear power plant reaches the end of its license life, it must be
either decommissioned or its license extended. As the cost of replacing
retired plants becomes more prohibitive, utilities are considering the
latter alternative, seeking ways to operate existing plants longer.
Currently, utilities do not know what are the technical requirements for
maintaining proper operation of an aged plant, how to satisfy regulatory
requirements and how to deal with other institutional problems that
might arise. Utility managers will most probably have to make decisions
on life-extension programs with considerable uncertainty as to the
outcome of their efforts. In addition to the uncertainty associated
with regulatory decision-making, there is no experience to indicate that
plant improvements will necessarily result in profitable operation for
an extended lifetime. With these uncertainties, utility managers will
have difficulty in assuring their executives a profitable return on
investments for life-extension efforts.
If money were no object, any plant could be repaired to run
indefinitely, using as many replacement components and as much labor and
downtime as required. Consequently, utilities must study the financial
impact of any life-extension program before taking any action. Economic
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feasibility studies of life extension of nuclear plants have been
conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute (Negin, 1982). The
results of these studies revealed that life extension of nuclear power
plants is a realistic objective provided the assumptions used in their
analysis are valid.
Even if life extension of nuclear plants is economically feasible,
the potential safety concerns of operating an aged plant must be
considered as well. The public and plant personnel will certainly be
concerned about having on old nuclear plant continue to operate. The
burden of proof will be on the utility to assure the regulatory
authorities that the plant will operate safely when called upon to do so
given that the plant and all its equipment have continually grown older.
At this point, it is not clear what new regulations, guidelines and
procedures will be required for a utility to obtain approval of an
application for extended operation.
Some of the regulatory agencies concerns may be reflected in
additional technical requirements to assure the capability of safety-
related systems and components to perform their intended safety
functions. Utility managers need to know the history and the status of
the plant in order to assess the functional capability of safety-related
systems, as well as non-safety systems. In particular, it is important
to know the effects of age on equipment and whether age is a design
limit. Given the technical problem of plant aging and the safety
concerns of operating an aged plant, the problem which utilities face
for extending the life of their nuclear facility is to determine all the
technical and institutional requirements which would assure the safe and
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efficient operation of the plant for an extended life and to increase
the probability of obtaining an extended operating license.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this report is to state clearly the barriers to life
extension and to describe what a utility must do and think about in
order to extend plant life. Furthermore, the report will draw attention
to the unanswered questions regarding the functional requirements of
plant systems and components, the uncertainty associated with assessing
the impact of age-related degradation on the operability of equipment
and the difficulty of defining precisely the status of the "health" of
the plant at any time.
One of the important tasks is to determine the environmental and
operating conditions under which systems and components were originally
designed to function. In particular, utility managers must know how age
was a consideration in the design of equipment. Design information
would be essential for the utility in order to judge the remaining
useful service life of equipment and to determine effective maintenance
and surveillance practices to assure continued proper operation of this
equipment. In the absence of such information, utility managers must
initiate efforts to formulate age-related design limits for each of the
plants systems and components; the work would involve collection of
operating data (e.g., mechanical and thermal cycles, radiation levels)
and thorough monitoring of equipment to observe degradation processes.
The lack of understanding of age-related degradation would make it
difficult for plant managers to rely solely on aging assessments in
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determining the functional capability of equipment. For this reason,
uncertainty will play an important role in utility decision-making
regarding life extension of nuclear plants.
Also, utilities must be concerned about the adequacy of existing
maintenance and surveillance practices at their plants. Maintenance
that has not been properly conducted because of improper procedures or
installation of substandard components will result in a significant
decrease in equipment operability. This report reviews several
maintenance and surveillance procedures developed to detect degradation
in equipment and to maintain proper operation of equipment. Many
components can be identified which should be monitored for degradation.
Turbines, pumps, valves, and condensers might have deep-seated flaws,
nondestructive evaluation using x-radiation may be used to detect these
flaws. Main steam piping and valve bodies should be monitored for the
effects of erosion. The steel and head flanges of the reactor pressure
vessel should be monitored for cracks. The upper and lower casing of
the turbine should be monitored for flange cracking, vibration effects
at support points, erosion and corrosion.
Another important objective of this report is to help the reader
understand th complexity of age-related degradation phenomena thoughout
the nuclear power plant. A large number of phenomena can cause failures
such as wear, creep, corrosion and mechanical and thermal fatigue. For
utilities, the task of increasing the equipment's operability requires
the process of understanding the age-related degradation effects on
equipment, obtaining accurate knowledge of failures or of degraded
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components, carefully analyzing the problem and developing sound
corrective measures to lengthen component life.
1.3 Method of Attack
Investigation of the subject matter of this report was carried out
in the following manner:
(1) Available literature on life-extension and aging of nuclear
power plants'was reviewed by conducting a computerized
literature search. A major part of this literature dealt with
age-related degradation of safety-related equipment and its
impact on the qualification procedures for this equipment.
(2) Interviews and meetings were held with utility engineers to
discuss the technical and institutional barriers to life-
extension. After the first meeting, it was concluded that the
best approach for investigating these issues was to conduct
interviews with engineers expert in the following areas:
electrical equipment and instrumentation, mechanical equipment,
licensing and safety, and system chemistry and corrosion. The
interviews were aimed at determining the plant equipment most
susceptible to age-related degradation, the functional
requirements of plant systems and components and whether age is
a design basis, and the steps utilities should take for
successful life extension of their nuclear plants.
(3) Finally, literature on the plant in consideration was reviewed
to understand the different components and systems and the
technical requirements for the safe and proper operation of the
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plant. Literature reviewed included the Final Safety Analysis
Report and the Technical Specifications for systems at the
plant. An effort was made to identify age-related design
limits for systems and components. In addition, the operating
history of the plant and the maintenance and surveillance
practices in use were studied; the aim was to determine
improved operating practices and better maintenance and
surveillance procedures that could be implemented to help
extend the life of the plant.
1.4 General View of Major Findings
One of the impbrtant technical barriers to extension of the life of
a nuclear power plant is ignorance of the age-related design limits of
critical components and systems. This information would allow the
utility to define the status of the plant relative to the plant's design
lifetime. A review of the literature on nuclear-power-plant design did
not indicate the age-related design limits of systems and components.
Furthermore, it is not clear how a basis for defining these limits would
be determined. Efforts must be undertaken by the utility to discover
what equipment should be tested and monitored and what data should be
taken. Also, practical technical studies are required to estimate the
condition of plant systems and components relative to their design
limits. The utility must be able to determine the time when it can
expect a gradual loss in useful service life of critical components of
the reactor system.
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Knowledge of design limits is essential for assessing the end of
the useful life of components and systems and for anticipating failure.
However, it is also important to detect and mitigate aging effects.
There are several plans that may be implemented to detect aging effects,
including reliability assessment, operation monitoring, trending
analysis and accelerated aging. Existing maintenance and surveillance
practices must be reviewed and if necessary improved procedures that
identify aging effects should be instituted. In addition, research into
the basic mechanisms of aging would be beneficial to the utility. To
mitigate age-related problems, the utility must determine which
components should be replaced or upgraded and what improved operating
procedures would slow the aging process.
Finally, it must be emphasized that a decision to implement a life-
extension program will have to be made with considerable uncertainty as
to its success. The uncertainties regarding the effects of plant aging
would make decision-making difficult. Utilities cannot ignore the
negative aspects associated with plant aging, namely, higher operation
costs, reduced productivity, the potential for unanticipated
catastrophic failure, and the presence of undetected deterioratng parts.
The absence of design information makes it difficult to make any
judgement about the remaining useful service life of plant equipment.
Furthermore, even with extensive efforts by utilities (including
replacement and upgrading of major equipment) to prepare a nuclear plant
for extended operation, there is uncertainty in gaining the confidence
of regulatory agencies and obtaining an extended operating license.
Utilities will probably not know what to expect in terms of additional
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technical requirements to assure the capability of safety-related
equipment to perform their intended safety function.
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CHAPTER 2
NECESSARY ACTIONS TO EXTEND PLANT LIFE
Utilities must carefully determine the technical difficulties that
must be addressed in order to successfully extend the life of an aged
nuclear power plant. For a utility, extending plant life means doing
what is necessary to assure that equipment will operate safely and
efficiently in order to meet plant capacity factor goals for an extended
time. From an economic viewpoint, the utility must have confidence in
the functional capability of equipment (that unexpected failures will
not occur at an unacceptably high rate) and believe that the plant will
perform profitably. Also, to assure public safety, the utility must be
able to demonstrate to regulatory agencies that aged safety systems will
operate to prevent release of radioactivity to the environment. There
are many steps a utility can take to achieve the goals of operability
and safety. But it must be emphasized that economic constraints and
technical limitations might make it difficult and even impossible to
take certain necessary actions.
From the research conducted to date, including interviews with
utility staff and reviews of relevant literature, the following is a
list of necessary actions to be taken by a utility to help extend the
life of a nuclear power plant:
(1) Identify operational modifications which could be made for
life extension.
(2) Identify plant modifications potentially needed for life
extension.
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(3) Document the operational life of the plant and determine
documentation needs for life extension.
(4) Document cases of premature component failure. Note the
identified cause. Compare major equipment reliability records
with the records of similar equipment in similar plants to
trend the performance of the plant's own equipment. Analyzing
why equipment at the plant fares better or worse than the
industry average could prove to be a very effective method for
anticipating problems.
(5) Conduct a survey of the plant's physical condition needs.
Review maintenance records and conduct interviews with the
operation crew to identify potential trouble areas. Assess
the condition of accessible equipment.
(6) Make a list of equipment in the plant requiring additional
inspection, tests, or analyses.
(7) Determine whether similar major equipment (turbine generators,
feedwater pumps, feedwater heaters, moisture separators,
reheaters, condensers, structural supports, etc.) in nuclear
and fossil plants have similar failure rates. If not,
determine causes for the different experience.
(8) Manage the aging of nuclear power plant systems, components
and structures. Identify aging effects, ways to mitigate the
degradation, and identify means to prevent premature aging of
specific components (discussed in Chapter 4).
(9) Make sure that spare parts are available when needed.
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(10) Decide which equipment have to be monitored, determine the
types and number of instruments to be used and what data
should be taken and how it should be processed.
(11) Consideration must be given to all significant types of
degradation that can have an effect on the functional
capability of equipment. It should be noted that there are
considerable uncertainties regarding the aging process and
the environmental factors that could result in such
degradation.
(12) Determine the age-related considerations that were taken into
account when manufacturers designed components. This
information was not available in the literature received from
the utility and does not appear to be easily available from
equipment vendors in most cases.
(13) Determine the documentation requirements for preparing a new
safety analysis report to support an application for operating
license extension.
(14) Determine which equipment needs replacement, upgrading or
overhauling.
(15) Determine the feasibility of replacement or repair of major
equipment such as the steam generators.
(16) Determine the number of thermal and mechanical cycles (fatigue
limits) equipment could sustain without failing.
(17) Maintain qualification of all safety-related equipment taking
into account the effects of aging. Note the uncertainties in
accelerated aging testing and the lack of understanding of the
full effects of age-related degradation mechanisms
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(17) (discussed in Chapter 4).
(18) Understand the true expected life of various electric cable
insulations under a variety of service conditions to support
extended plant life. Utility engineers believe cable
insulation will be significantly susceptible to age-related
degradation.
(19) Verify that biological shield concrete and/or primary shield
tanks are suitable for extended life and determine
verification data requirments, if any, through plant life.
This should include heating and cooling effects as well as
neutron irradiation effects.
(20) Conduct accelerated mechanical and thermal cycle tests with
operating steady-state stresses superimposed to understand the
actual lifetime and potential vulnerabilities in the following
equipment: control-rod-drive components, thermal sleeves,
main turbo-generator shafts and rotors, and reactor coolant
pump shafts.
(21) Determine whether major rotating equipment failure rates are
age-dependent.
(22) Document mechanical and thermal cycles at the plant and
compare with original design in order to assure extended life
feasibility.
(23) Review plant maintenace programs to determine whether more
comprehensive efforts would be advisable if plants are to be
operated for 60 to 80 years versus 40 years.
(24) If possible, extend steam generator service-life by improving
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maintenance practices. Investigate steam generator failures
and discover effective remedies.
(25) Determine whether neutron radiation damage in reactor vessel
material (embrittlement) will reduce the availability of the
nuclear steam supply system during the extended-life operation
of the plant.
(26) Investigate the effects of vibration and neutron irradiation
on reactor core structure and internals.
(27) Study practices which have lead to successful operation of
fossil plants for an extended lifetime. Use this knowledge to
establish a basis for extending the operating life of nuclear
plants.
2-5

CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF AGE-RLATED IDEGADATION
3.1 Introduction
A nuclear plant, like any thermal-electric system, can supply power
only as long as its component parts operate in a proper manner. In
other words, a plant must function in accordance with actual design
criteria. Since every plant is designed with some limitations depending
on the capability of a specific component in the system, any degradation
of plant equipment may limit generation output as well as affect overall
efficiency of operations. Therefore, it is necessary to identify
degradation possibilities of all equipment and understand the phenomena
of age-related degradation before critical equipment in the plant may
fail.
There has been evidence of age-related degradation at nuclear power
plants in operation due to a wide variety of mechanisms. Of the more
than 35,000 abnormal operating events reported in 1969 through 1982,
about 5,900 events had age-related causes (ORNL, 1983). Age-related
degradation is expected to be a major factor in the performance of
mature nuclear plants and an important barrier to successful life
extension. Among other such factors are safety-related plant backfits,
and premature replacement of major components such as steam generators.
Literature reviewed to date on nuclear power plant aging have
addressed the problem of age-related degradation in the context of the
qualification of safety-related equipment. A substantial amount of
research into the basic mechansims of material degradation has been
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conducted at Sandia Laboratories (Bader, 1982). This has included
research on the influence of oxygen diffusion in materials in
conjunction with radiation, radiation dose-rate effects, and the
synergistic effects of heat, radiation, and humidity. However, it
should be recognized, on the basis of the rate of progress from past
research on aging and synergistic effects, that results are obtained
slowly.
Age-related degradation is a significant problem which utilities
must deal with throughout the plant. All plant systems and components
must be evaluated to determine their susceptibility to age-related
degradation. The influence of environmental and operating conditions on
material degradation should be completely understood. This can be
difficult because aging cannot be usefully investigated in real time;
accelerated aging testing (Bader, 1982) must be performed, and it is
uncertain that the acceleration produces real-time aging. The
uncertainties about the effects of aging is one of the major fators
which will affect utility decision-making regarding life-extension. It
would be in the interest of utilities to investigate the mechanisms of
age-related degradation and the effects of aging on plant equipment.
3.2 Mechanisms of Age-Related Degradation
What we mean-by age-related degradation (also referred to as aging)
is the effect of operational, environmental, and system conditions on
equipment which lead to a degradation of performance of equipment over
time (IEEE, 1974). Nuclear power plants in operation have shown
evidence of aging due to the following (Marriott, 1984):
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(1) subtle, unanticipated material-environmental interctions (for
example, stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel piping welds
and steam genertor failures)
(2) the effects of neutron radiation on the fracture toughness of
reactor vessel steels - a degradation mechanism anticipated in
design but whose rate was under predicted (Marriott, 1984)
(3) overuse in normal service or too-frequent testing (for example,
valve-seat wear)
(4) mechanical and thermal cycling resulting in fatigue
(5) wear
(6) creep
(7) environmental effects (synergistic effects of heat, radiation and
humidity, and for example, loss of insulator resistance).
Backfits and design changes may introduce new aging mechanisms or
special aging concerns. For example, installation of added electronic
equipment in a controlled air-conditioned environment may add to the
heat load sufficiently to make local temperature control inadequate,
thereby, contributing to thermal degradation of the electronics.
Similarly, replacement of a pump with one of larger capacity in an
auxilliary system may lead to degradation of interrelated piping
components due to water hammer or erosion (Marriott, 1984).
Utilities should undertake efforts to fully understand the subtle
mechanisms of aging and their effects on equipment. It is not known how
fast equipment age and how heat, radiation and humidity affect the aging
process. Answers to these questions may suggest steps to improve the
environmental conditions surrounding equipment and to slow the effects
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of aging.
3.3 Factors Affecting Aging
The environment within a reactor system is characterized by high
temperatures, radiation fields (especially high-energy neutrons) and
high stresses. Age-related degradation of equipment during normal
service operation may be the result of a variety of environmental stress
mechanisms acting either independently or synergistically. Table 3.1
lists components and the stresses they may be susceptible to in a
nuclear plant. The environmental stresses may be constant, periodic, or
intermittent. Equipment stress resulting from normal operation may be
grouped in two general categories; external environmental stresses and
internal functional load stresses (Ratio, 1983).
External environmental stresses are typically incurred from such
influences as atmospheric conditions (pressure, temperature, humidity,
and chemical composition), radiation, vibration, and maintenance
operation. Internal functional load stresses result from such sources
as power supply fluctuations (electrical stresses), mechanical operation
(mechanical stresses, self-induced vibration) and process fluid
variations (Ratio, 1983).
This brief description of factors influencing aging should not be
considered complete. There may be other environmental and mechanical
forces which can contribute to the aging process. The extreme
environmental conditions (high temperatures and pressures and neutron
radiation) in a reactor system, which haven't been encountered in other
technological systems, means that plant managers must continue to be
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TABLE 3.1
Stresses on Couponents in a
Nuclear Power Plant
Source: (Drago, 1982)
Component Types
Accumulators, tanks
Air dryers
Annunciator modules
Batteries
Blowers, fans, compressors
Battery changers
Circuit breakers, motor starters, fuses
Control Fods
Control rod drive mechanisms
Demineralizers
Electric connectors (cable, bus, wires)
Internal combustion engines
Filters, strainers, screens
Fuel elements
Generators, inverters
Electric heaters
Lifting devices (cranes, hoists, jacks)
Heat exchangers (coolers, heaters, steam
generators, evaporators)
Instruments, controls, sensors
Mechanical function units (gear boxes)
Motors (electric, hydraulic, pneumatic)
Penetrations, air locks, hatches
Pipes, fittings
Pumps
Recombiners
Relays
Shock suppressors and supports
Switches
Switchgear, load control centers, motor
control centers, panel boards
Transformers
Turbines (gas, steam)
Valves
Valve operators
Pressure vessels (reactor vessels,
pressurizers)
Stresses*
T,M,C,H
T,M
E,H
E,C,H
M,E,V
E,M
E,H
M,R,V
M,R,W,V
C
E,R,C
M,T
W
R,V,T,M,C
E,M,V
T,E
M,T,R
T,M,C,R,H
E,H,M
M
E,M
M
C,M,V
M,V
C
E,H
M
E,H
E
E
M,C
M,W
R,T,M,C
*Stress codes - thermal (T), mechanical (M), radiation (R), humidity
(H), wear (W), electrical (E), vibration (V), chemical reactions (C).
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vigilant for signs of trouble.
3.4 Evidence of Aging from Operating Plants (ORNL, 1983)
As mentioned in section 3.1, about 17% of the abnormal operating
events reported to the NRC had age-related causes. About 8% of the
events resulted from instrument "drift" - the set point, or calibration
of a safety-related instrument was found to be outside acceptance
criteria contained in the plants technical specifications. The
remaining 9% of the events were attributed to other age-related causes
such as wear, corrosion, oxidation, crud deposition and fatigue. Those
age-related effects caused degradation or failure in a variety of
components. Of the components that failed due to age-related causes,
20% were valves; 14% pumps; 5% diesel generators; 3 steam generator
tubes; 3% heat exchangers; and less than 1% each for about 120 other
components.
Although the data base is small now, industry-wide experience with
nuclear plant operation can provide utilities with valuable information
in the future about equipment which has degraded due to age-related
effects. Continued support of industry-wide data collection should be
encouraged by utility managers. Also, individual utilities should take
steps to collect aging effects data from their nuclear plants.
3.5 Concept of Aging in Equipment Qualification
The nuclear power industry has made a concentrated effort to
include the effects of aging in the qualification of safety-related
equipment. In order for equipment to be qualified, it is necessary that
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the effects of age-related degradation on the safety-related function be
considered. The intent of qualification is to demonstrate that safety-
related equipment will perform its safety-related function during a
design-basis event while it is in its worst state of deterioration.
Design-basis events are postulated events (specified by the safety
analysis of the plant) used in the design to establish the acceptable
performance requirements of the structures and systems (IEEE, 1980).
The assessment of equipment aging effects includes an analysis of
the equipment to determine any significant aging mechanisms. The
equipment is reviewed in terms of design, function, materials, and
environment for its specified application. A significant aging effect
adversely affects the ability of the equipment to perform its safety
function under design basis events.
After identifying the significant aging effects of the equipment,
accelerated aging techniques are used to simulate the aging mechanism in
the real environment. This simulation is accomplished by applying in-
service stresses (for example, thermal, radiation, wear and vibration)
at magnitudes or rates that are greater than expected in-service levels
but less than the material property limitations. Next, the artificially
aged equipment is installed in its service location and exposed to
simulated environmental conditions of design-basis events. The
equipment is considered to have passed the qualification test when it
meets the values of performance parameters which demonstrate the ability
of the equipment to perform its safety function for applicable service
conditions.
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3.6 Chapter Summary
The effects of aging must be known completely by plant managers in
order for them to have assurance that the plant's aged equipment will
continue to function properly for an extended lifetime. Thorough
detailed aging analyses of equipment can indicate which materials are
most sensitive to age-related degradation caused by thermal, radiation,
humidity, or wear stress mechanisms (this will be discussed in the next
chapter). Once these stress mechanisms are known, the maintenance and
surveillance crew can focus attention on those particular parts of the
equipment to determine if the age-related degradation rates are greater
than what had been originally anticipated. Although some of the
mechanisms of age-related degradation and the factors which influence
this degradation are known, still much remains to be discovered about
the rate of aging, synergistic effects of heat, radiation and humidity,
and methods to account for aging in the qualification of equipment for
nuclear power generating stations.
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CHAPTER 4
MANAGING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AGING
4.1 Introduction
Experience with most technical systems shows that component aging
failures are to be expected with increasing service. These may prove to
be troublesome to manage in a nuclear power plant since parameters
necessary to predict useful life in the plant environment are often not
available. But, to establish a safety basis for operating nuclear
plants beyond their design lifetimes, utilities must initiate efforts to
determine what the aging effects are, and how to detect and mitigate
them.
4.2 Identification of Aging Effects and Anticipation of Failure
Utilities must perform a thorough analysis to systematically
identify the components, systems and structures that are likely to cause
availability and safety problems if not maintained, restored or
replaced. Several plans may be used to detect aging effects and to
anticipate failure. These are: reliability assessment, operation
monitoring, trending analysis, non-destructive evaluation and
accelerated aging-testing.
4.2.1 Reliability Assessment (Kahl, 1984)
With the aging of the U.S. nuclear plant population, it will
eventually be possible to develop an understanding of the aging of
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systems and components from the historical operating records of these
plants. To assure safe extended generating life of old nuclear plants
will require an understanding of the changes in reliability of safety
systems caused by aging. Predominant modes of failure may change in
latter years of operation, and the ability to identify and monitor these
modes will be essential to safe operation.
A primary in-plant information source for documenting component
aging and its effects is the maintenance work logs kept by plant
maintenance supervisors to track component failures and repairs. The
In-Plant Reliability Data System (Kahl, 1984) is being developed by the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory to collect, organize and study this
component information from a sampling of U.S. nuclear power plants.
The previous focus of the IPRDS program had been the corrective
maintenance histories of safety related equipment, including pumps,
valves, diesel generators, batteries, battery chargers, and inverters.
Current efforts of the IPRDS program include broadening the information
base to involve other in-plant records that contribute information
needed to reconstruct the operating and failure histories of
components.
The important in-plant documents and their appropriate
contributions to the component aging history include:
(1) Operator's log - Gives the day-to-day operating regimes and
the cycling of systems and components through various phases of plant
operation and documents unusual developments or occurrences that may
upset the internal component environment (e.g., system parameters), or
the external environment (e.g., high radiation, fire).
(2) Surveillance and testing procedures and results - Provides the
4-2
regimes of periodic testing operations that the component is required to
undergo. Documents methods and monitoring techniques currently used to
detect symptoms of aging or other degradation.
(3) Preventive maintenance (PM) procedures - Describes the
component parts replaced, adjusted, or repaired, thereby identifying
steps used in mitigating aging consequences and identifying any
potential for human factor effects.
(4) Systems description and drawings - Gives plant location of
components, flow paths within a system, and interconnections between
systems, which help in defining internal and external environments
affecting the components.
Assembling the operating history of failed components from these
sources and using information from post mortem evaluations can lead to
an understanding of the complex mechanisms of aging and means for its
early detection by proper monitoring and prevention techniques.
Documented in Table 4.1 is the failure history of a feedwater pump.
Degrees of failure severity are represented by the following three
distinct levels:
· Incipient failure - no effect on pumping function was noted, but
evidence of impending problems did exist (e.g. noisy bearing)
· Degraded failure - the pump function was impaired; and
· Catastrophic failure - pump could not function.
A decreased number of catastrophic failures and overall failures per
year is evident from this table after implementation of the PM policy.
As one might expect from improved surveillance as part of the improved
PM program, the reported incipient failures of the pump increased
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TABLE 4.1
Frequency of Failure (by degree of severity)
For a Feedwater Pump From
1976-1980
Source: (Kahl, 1984)
Year 1976
Number of incipient
failures
Number of degraded
failures
Number of catastrophic
failures
Total number of
failures
8
1
1
10
1977*
16
0
2
18
1978
3
4
0
7
*Plant managers initiated an improved preventive maintenance policy.
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1979 1980
2 3
1 0
0 0
3 3
notably within the first year after initiation of the PM program. As
seen in the failure history, incipient failures can provide evidence of
degradation mechanisms and may yield forewarning of more severe
problems.
Only with a comprehensive history of the component operating
regimes and system parameters, coupled with effective PM, and accurate
information of the operating environment conditions can one develop an
aging history of a component.
4.2.2 Operation Monitoring
Plant operation data attainable from the output of already existing
instrumentation, such as detectors and sensors, can be analyzed either
on-line or off-line for early identification of system degradation. Use
of advanced monitoring techniques for maintenance and testing can also
allow for on-line detection of degradation (Keyvan, 1984).
A special class of surveillance techniques called "condition
monitoring" (CM) uses quantitative indicators to monitor the "health" of
equipment. CM relies on measuring a number of relevant parameters and
plotting the results to observe a trend in the degradation of critical
components in the equipment. This can be done continuously or
intermittently on a schedule that is consistent with the existing
preventive maintenance schedule. The assessment of existing damage
versus the undamaged and failed conditions allows for extrapolation of
remaining life (Sugarman, 1984).
CM is based on measuring degradation of the components with the
most limiting lifetimes. The limiting components can be identified
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through testing and/or analysis. Usually, equipment located in the
worst case environment considering all stresses (radiation, temperature,
humidity) is selected for monitoring. The method is applicable for
mechanical as well as electrical equipment (Sugarman, 1983).
Condition monitoring techniques are related to preventive
maintenance and accelerated qualification testing. Examples of such
techniques are vibration monitoring to detect rotating machinery bearing
wear and partial discharge testing of large motors. These techniques
detect wear and forecast incipient failure of components. Condition
monitoring is merely an enhancement of existing techniques which can be
incorporated into present nuclear plant surveillance and preventive
maintenance procedures (Sugarman, 1984).
4.2.3 Trending Analysis
Trending the performance of the plant's own equipment and analyzing
why it fares better or worse than the industry average can be a very
effective method for anticipating age-related problems. A detailed
surveillance program may be employed, initially involving visual
inspection of equipment, environmental survey and a review of plant
maintenance records and procedures to identify potential trouble areas.
The program can be supplemented by interviews with the operation crew to
identify various problem areas where visual and record inspection fails
(Keyvan, 1984).
The results of these efforts may be compiled in a computer
inventory management system. This program would use also other data
extracted from plant specific records and information systems. Examples
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of data sources are operation and outage logs, maintenance orders, the
IPRDS and licensee evaluation reports. In addition, other sources of
data from plants of the same manufacturer and vintage as the plant under
consideration can be included in the program (Keyvan, 1984).
The inventory management program can be designed to give detailed
information about components. For example, detailed analysis of
historical data related to plant outages can be performed, identifying
equipment which has exhibited an increasing failure rate and/or long
outage duration, which may possibly be attributed to age or outdated
design. The program would be most useful if it were capable of
segregating components which were reaching their endpoints at the end of
the plant's life (Keyvan, 1984).
4.2.4 Non-Destructive Evaluation (Fagenbaum, 1984)
In order to detect the slightest material degradation in critical
equipment, emergency core cooling systems, piping and other plant
components, it is necessary to have available the most advanced testing
methods. Non-destructive evaluation techniques allow plant operators to
carry out inspection routines quickly and easily to avoid system
failures that would threaten the safety of the entire plant. The non-
destructive evaluation techniques used today include: x-ray
radiography, xerography, fluoroscopy, neutron radiography, visual aids,
focused ultrasound and multiple-frequency eddy currents.
Because of the nature of deep-seated flaws that may be located in
nuclear power systems in or near the reactor containment building such
as in pressure vessels, steam generators, turbines, pumps, valves,
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condensers, and cooling water pumps, NDE inspection requires instruments
capable of penetrating and diagnosing the innermost part of an object.
This type of testing generally involves an energy exchange in the form
of absorption and emission of radiation. X-radiation is among the best-
known ways of doing this within the nuclear power industry.
Radiographic observation involves the recording of x-radiation
transmitted onto a film to produce a shadow picture. Using radiography,
it is possible to locate shrinkage, the position of cracks,
discontinuities, foreign materials, and gas cavities.
Tools that are being increasingly applied to the non-destructive
evaluation of nuclear fuel materials are pulsed neutron sources and high
resolution two-dimensional neutron detectors. A notable characteristic
of thermal neutron radiography, as opposed to x-ray evaluation, is the
high penetration ability of the neutron when it is used with metals.
Another attribute is the ability of neutron radiography to pick out the
material containing hydrogen in a test element. This is due to the
large neutron cross sections for hydrogen at thermal energies.
Visual aids such as periscopes, telescopes, microscopes,
photographic recordings, fiber-optic devices and borescopes are among
the simplest of instruments used to monitor the integrity of components
like pipes and tubes. For example, the borescope is used to inspect the
interior surfaces of vessels and tubes and consists of an eyepiece and
an optical train. An instrument that is smaller, more flexible and
microprocessor-based is the fiberscope. This device uses smooth fibers
of transparent material that transmit light very efficiently. Each
fiber carries light independently of the others. One bundle of fibers
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transmits light from an external source to illuminate an object; the
second bundle carries the image formed by the objective lens at the tip
of the instrument back to the eyepiece.
Liquid penetrant tests are often a useful method of checking for
surface defects, and for subsurface defects with surface openings. This
type of test typically uncovers flaws like surface cracks, lack of bond
between edges of joined material, porosity, laminations, and leaks in
tanks and tubing. Materials that have been inspected with liquid
penetrants include ceramics, glass, ferrous and non ferrous metals,
powdered metal products, plastics, and synthetic products.
Although non-destructive evaluation techniques are effective tests
to characterize and qualify flaws in plant equipment, there are
limitations to its usefulness. In many cases there are differences in
the engineer's and technician's interpretation of NDE equipment data
from inspection routines. For example, coolant piping and pressure
vessel systems in nuclear power plants are made of materials that are
nonhomogeneous in composition, and which during non-destructive testing
will sometimes generate signals that mimic flaws. Also, there are
factors that make testing difficult. These include heat, humidity,
radiation, and inconvenient equipment and system locations. Finally, it
is not known what equipment cannot be tested for by NDE techniques.
4.2.5 Accelerated Aging (Bader, 1982)
A technique that is of limited success for determining the
remaining life of plant components is accelerated aging. It is
sometimes necessary to use accelerated aging tests to predict the life
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of long-life components. The objective of accelerated aging is to
increase the rate of aging of a component subject to the constraint that
the dominant physical mechanisms responsible for aging do not change
from those associated with operation at normal stress. This testing
procedure has been applied at nuclear'power generating stations to
satisfy the aging requirement for qualification of safety-related
equipment (this equipment is listed in Table 4.2).
The requirement to account for degradation of the functional
capability in the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment
for nuclear power applications became generalized by the publication of
IEEE (Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers) Std 323-1974
and its endorsement by Regulatory Guide 1.89. In 1980, the aging
requirement was extended through IEEE Std 627-1980 to the qualification
of mechanical equipment. The existing aging qualification procedure can
be smmarized as follows: identify significant aging mechanisms,
establish accelerated aging procedures based on existing technology, and
establish a qualified life. In practice, this frequently is translated
into deriving a qualified life primarily on the basis of thermal aging.
After a large amount of equipment qualification testing and
analysis, there is a widespread recognition of the limitations of
accelerated aging techniques in establishing equipment qualification
lifetimes. The NRC regulation requiring qualification of safety-related
equipment has posed the problem for utilities of establishing a
qualified life for this equipment, which is the period of normal service
represented by the accelerated aging part of the qualification. To
extend the life of a nuclear plant, utilities might have to establish
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TABLE 4.2
Safety-Related Equipment
Required To Be Qualified
Source: (NRC Regulatory Guide 1.89, 1974)
Engineered Safeguards Actuation
Reactor Protection
Containment Isolation
Steamline Isolation
Main Feedwater Shutdown and Isolation
Emergency Power
Emergency Core Cooling
Containment Heat Removal
Containment Fission Product Removal
Containment Combustible Gas Control
Auxiliary Feedwater
Containment Ventilation
Containment Radiation Monitoring
Control Room Habitability Systems
Ventilation for Areas Containing Safety Equipment
Component Cooling
Service Water
Emergency Shutdown
Post-Accident Sampling and Monitoring
Radiation Monitoring
Safety-Related Display Instrumentation
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qualified lives for most, if not all, equipment in the plant. It is
important to understand that this task would be difficult in view of the
limitations of accelerated aging techniques. Whatever accelerated aging
procedure is used, it is very likely to produce significantly more or
significantly less degradation of functional capability than will take
place in the application. The reason for this is that existing
accelerated aging techniques cannot recreate the exact environmental and
operating conditions under which equipment normally functions. Usually
the effect of a single stress (thermal) has been accounted for; however,
the real environment consists of many other stresses, some of which act
synergistically. There are no practical models for these aging
stresses. Furthermore, the non-linear reaction rates present in the
real service environment are very difficult to simulate accurately by
accelerated aging techniques which fail to account for the slow
interactions between the environmental stresses and the equipment.
Installed equipment is subject to all of the aging stresses and
synergistic effects and all of the interface influences of the real
service environment. The effects of aging of interfaces and junctions
between materials and components and the synergistic effects of combined
stresses and/or chemical reactions are not known. In view of the
uncertainties associated with existing procedures for taking equipment
degradation into account, it is essential to monitor equipment
degradation in service as a supplement to existing qualification
procedures. Since existing surveillance, inspection, testing, repair,
and maintenance procedures do not adequately fulfill the needs of
degradation monitoring, there is a need to study this topic. Utilities
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should undertake an investigation to determine what existing
surveillance procedures can be applied directly to degradation
monitoring and what monitoring procedures require development.
4.2.6 Thermal and Radiation Aging Degradation of Selected Materials
(CYAPC, Docket 50-213)
A partial list of materials which may be found in a nuclear power
plant along with an indication of the material susceptibility to
significant degradation due to radiation or thermal aging is given in
Table 4.3.
Susceptibility to significant thermal aging in a 45*C environment
and normal atmosphere for 10 to 40 years is indicated by an (*) in the
appropriate column. Significant aging degradation is defined as that
amount of degradation that would place in substantial doubt the ability
of typical equipment using these materials to function in a hostile
environment.
Susceptibility to radiation damage is indicated by the dose level
and the observed effect identified in the column headed BASIS. The
meaning of the terms used to characterize the dose effect is as
follows:
· Threshold - Refers to damage threshold, which is the radiation
exposure required to change at least one physical property of the
material
* Allowable - Refers to the radiation which can be absorbed before
serious degradation occurs.
The materials list can be used by a utility to make judgements as
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TABLE 4.3
Thermal and Radiation Aging Degradation
of Selected Materials
Source: (CYAPC, Docket 50-213)
MATERIAL1
POTENTIAL FOR
SIGNIFICANT
AGING
10 years 40 years
Integrated Circuits
N-Mos
Transistors
Vulcanized Fiber
Capacitors-Tantalum
Polyethylene
Tetzel
Silicon Rubber
Diodes
Polyester (unfilled)
Nylon
Polycarbonate
RADIATION
SUSCEPTIBILITY
Rads Gamma Basis
103
*
*
*
104
10 5
106
10 7
106
106
104
105
105
10 6
Threshold
Threshold
Threshold
Allowable
Allowable
Threshold
Threshold
Threshold
Threshold
Threshold
Threshold
1These materials may be found in cables, connectors, motors, sensors,
instrument panels, valve operators and other electrical equipment.
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to the possibility of a particular material in a particular application
being susceptible to significant degradation due to radiation or thermal
aging. This list can be expanded as additional information becomes
available. Also, it would be useful to know the effect of other aging
stresses on the materials listed, particularly the synergistic effects
of combined stresses. Further study on the aging degradation of
materials to establish a safety basis for extended life operation of a
nuclear plant is needed.
4.3 Solving Age-Related Problems (Marriott, 1984)
After identifying age-related problem areas in the plant, the next
step is definition of alternative remedies for each of the plant's
physical problems. Remedies include replacement, overhaul, use of
spares, early warning instrumentation, actions to eliminate the failure
mode, specialized preventive maintenance, improved training, and
contingency analysis for permitting operation with equipment out of
service. For each problem, all remedies must be economically compared
to select the best solution.
4.3.1 Equipment Replacement or Upgrading (Marriott, 1983)
Replacing or upgrading certain aging equipment will be necessary
for extending the operating lives of nuclear power plants. The costs of
replacing aging equipment appear to represent a small portion of the
total plant costs provided that down time isn't excessive. Critical
components that may need to be replaced are steam generators, turbine-
generators, major pumps and valves, condensers and electric cables and
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insulation. It is not known whether the reactor pressure vessel must be
replaced. Failure of the reactor pressure vessel from embrittlement is
a worry because of the reactor safety problems which it might pose and
because of the high cost of replacing a reactor vessel. The utility
must determine which equipment will likely pose reliability problems as
the plant ages. Those equipment which have shown chronic patterns of
failure in the past must be upgraded or replaced. Equipment in this
category are the steam generators, the reactor core, the turbine
generator and the reactor coolant pumps.
4.3.2 Condition Monitoring
A condition monitoring program can be implemented at a nuclear
power plant to extend equipment life where it is technically and
economically feasible. This program can be integrated with the plant
maintenance and surveillance programs and makes few additional demands
on the plant maintenance resources (Bader, 1982).
Condition monitoring (or degradation monitoring) of environmentally
qualified equipment is performed using the maintenance data recorded on
the maintenance histories. Equipment that reaches the end of its
qualified life but is not showing any degradation in the parameters
being monitored may be subjected to an engineering evaluation for
continued use so long as proper maintenance is performed and condition
monitoring continues (Sugarman, 1984).
The condition monitoring program is an on-line, interactive,
information system designed for processing maintenance and surveillance
data for the environmentally qualified equipment. The input data
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consist of the following: the equipment identification number and type
of surveillance tests, procedure number, brief description of the
equipment including manufacturer and model number, equipment location
and elevation, and two setpoints. The first setpoint is used as an
early warning indication of possible degradation in the equipment. The
second setpoint is where corrective action must be taken to either
repair or replace the equipment (Sugarman, 1984).
Not all equipment is equally suited to being monitored for age-
related degradation. Heavy rotating equipment such as turbine
generators is particularly appropriate for condition monitoring because
of the severe economic consequences of an unscheduled outage to an
electrical generating station if they go down unexpectedly. Condition
monitoring is currently being performed for this equipment by using
techniques such as acoustic and vibration monitoring for bearing wear
and dielectric-loss measurements on stator insulation (Sugarman, 1983).
The utility must select safety-related equipment items for which
condition monitoring procedures are most likely to produce a significant
benefit to public safety. Condition monitoring of lighter equipment
such as motor operators, solenoids, cables, and transmitters may be
technically feasible and may be a desirable option for meeting safety
and regulatory requirements. Some equipment such as electronic
equipment, tends to fail catastrophically and without warning and
therefore is not an appropriate subject for condition monitoring. In
Table 4.4, representative equipment items are categorized into three
groups of equipment according to the perceived applicability to
condition monitoring (Sugarman, 1983).
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TABLE 4.4
Categorization of Equipment for Condition
Monitoring
Source: (Sugarman, 1983)
Equipment For Which Condition Monitoring May Not Be Feasible
Terninal Blocks
Manual Switches
Amplifiers
Signal Converters
Recorders
Meters
Equipment For Which Some Condition Monitoring May Be Feasible
Penetrations
Power Supplies
Temperature Sensors
Radiation Monitors
Equipment For Which Condition Monitoring Is Feasible
Batteries
Battery Chargers
Generators
Transformers
Cables
Motors (for pumps, compressors, etc.)
Solenoids
Relays
Limit Switches
Circuit Breakers
Transmitters
4-18
Condition monitoring techniques can be classified as either
destructive examination (e.g. elongation of samples of insulation
material) or non-destructive examination (e.g. dielectric loss
measurements on stator windings in motors). It is important that the
test parameters be correlated with degradation that occurs with the age
of the equipment. Some parameters such as temperature and instrument
drift are indicative of more than one effect and cannot be used alone to
determine the condition of the equipment (Sugarman, 1983).
A well-structured condition monitoring program enhances utility
knowledge of equipment operational status. Utilities must identify
existing surveillance procedures that can be applied directly to
condition monitoring and identify monitoring procedures that require
development. The most important aspect of condition monitoring is
definition of the material or component property to be measured. This
property should degrade over time and be related to performance,
although not necessarily a direct performance property. For equipment
subject to condition monitoring programs, the component property to be
measured must be determined. An effective condition monitoring program
can provide continuing assurance of equipment operability over long time
periods.
4.3.3 Improved Operating Procedures (Tally, 1984)
An integral part of ensuring continued plant safety and longevity
of components is to operate the plant within the design envelope
provided by the designer. Each nuclear steam supply system design has
basic functional requirements that define what the system must be
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capable of experiencing without failure. These functional requirements
include transient and steady-state descriptions bounding anticipated and
many design-basis conditions and events. The transient descriptions
define the various fluid conditions throughout the system as a function
of time and are based on how the designer expects the plant to be
operated.
To methodically maintain and monitor records on plant transients, a
transient logging program may be employed. The first step in this
program is to provide guidelines for logging all significant transients
that the NSSS might experience. Next the actual operating plant
experience is compared with the functional design requirements to see if
the actual fluid conditions and number of cycles in the original design
documentation bounded the conditions which the plant experienced for
each transient. This program allows operators to note important trends
in plant operating characteristics and to take corrective action before
key components are significantly degraded. Paying close attention to
the operating history has another advantage. After a component failure
has occurred, the operational history of the component can help in
attempts to pinpoint the cause of failure.
4.3.4 Spare Parts Inventory Management (Suomi, 1983)
To assure timely replacement of failed parts, utilities may
implement a spare parts management program. This program must include a
thorough evaluation of equipment and a consistent application of sound
engineering judgement so that an optimized inventory may be maintained.
Availability of spare replacement parts can be a potential source
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of problems for an aged nuclear power plant being considered for life
extension. Certain components may be obsolete or the original
manufacturers may no longer be in business; the utility may have to go
to considerable expense and trouble to get replacements.
Perhaps the most significant factor in determining whether or not a
part should be stocked will be the effect of the part's failure on the
availability, safety, and reliability of the plant. If a spare parts
management program is to remain effective, it must take into account the
effects of facility age, new maintenance techniques, changes in delivery
lead time, changes in part costs, and state-of-the-art equipment
changes. Considerations such as these require that the inventory be
periodically re-evaluated so that -stocking levels can be adjusted,
poorly designed parts replaced, and unnecessary items eliminated.
4.4 Chapter Summary
A comprehensive assessment of nuclear power plant component
operating histories, maintenance histories, and design and fabrication
details is essential to understanding aging phenomena. Programs can be
implemented to detect aging effects and to mitigate them. Component
maintenance or replacement schedules should include considerations of
the specific aging characteristics of the component materials. Ongoing
programs should exist at the plant to review surveillance and
maintenance records to assure that equipment which is exhibiting age-
related degradation will be identified and replaced as necessary. In
conclusion, utilities could make it feasible to extend the life of
operating nuclear plants by upgrading plant equipment, implementing good
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maintenance, surveillance, and spare parts inventory control programs
and necessary reliability assurance programs involving repair and
replacement of equipment.
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CHAPTER 5
AGE-RELATED DESIGN LIMITS OF COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS
When considering operation of a nuclear power plant beyond the 40
year design lifetime, it is important for the utility manager to know
the status of the plant in relation to the design life of the plant. In
most cases, the design life of various components and systems are not
available to the utility. When the lifetime-design limits are given, a
question arises as to how these limits were determined. A review of the
literature available from the utility studied on plant systems and
components failed to reveal design lives and the reason the age of
equipment and systems would limit their proper functioning in the plant.
Also, from discussions with the utility staff, this information does not
appear to be easily available from the equipment vendor. In the face of
such ignorance, utility managers must necessarily initiate research
efforts to formulate age-related design limits for each of the plants
systems and components and to investigate methods to estimate the plant
status in relation to the design limits.
Design information regarding the useful life of plant systems and
components would help utilities identify components likely to fail if
not replaced or restored. This information could be in the forms of a
design lifetime and age-related design limits. The design life of
equipment is the time during which satisfactory performance can be
expected for a specific set of service conditions. The life may be
specified in calendar time. However, operating time, number of
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operating cycles or other performance intervals, as appropriate, may be
used to determine this time. Age-related design limits can be given in
terms of the following stress level mechanisms: fatigue (number of
cycles), wear (amount of erosion of material), radiation (extent of
deterioration of molecular structures) and temperature (threshold limits
create material deterioration).
The only design information found in this study was a list of
component cycles or transient limits in the Standard Technical
Specifications for Westinghouse PWR's (NUREG-0452, Fall 1981). This
list is given in Table 5.1. It is not known how Westinghouse arrived at
these cyclic limits. Discussions with the utility revealed that
information regarding the number and types of cycles or transients
experienced at the plant are not gathered routinely, although some of
this information could be obtained by studying the operating log of the
plant. Also, discussions revealed that it is highly probable that these
limits have not been reached as the number of transients expected over
the lifetime of the plant (based on past experience) falls below these
limits. However, the importance of these limits for extending the life
of the power plant must be assessed and if necessary a transient logging
program (Tally, 1984) should be implemented.
The transient logging program would be the first step in the
process of demonstrating the adequacy of the reactor coolant system
components for the 40 year design life. This objective may be achieved
in four progressive stages, examining operating plant data, comparing
with design requirements, revising design requirements, and revising
stress analyses (Tally, 1984).
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TABLE 5.1
Component Cyclic or Transient Limits
Source: (Standard Technical Specifications for
Westinghouse PWR's, NUREG-0452, 1981).
CYCLIC OR
COMPONENT TRANSIENT LIMIT
DESIGN CYCLE
OR TRANSIENT
Reactor Coolant
System
(250) heatup cycles
at 100°F/hr and
(250) cooldown cycles
at < 100°F/hr
Heatup cycle- Tavg
from 200°F to >550°F
Cooldown cycle-Tavg
From 550°F to 200°F
(100) cycles of loss of
offsite A.C. electrical
power
(500) reactor trip
cycles
Loss offsite A.C.
electrical ESF
Electrical System
100% to 0% of RATED
THERMAL POWER
Secondary System (1) steam line break Break in a > 6 inch
steam line
(5) hydrostatic pressure
tests
Pressurized to
>(1350) psig.
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The second step in the evaluation process would be to compare the
actual operating plant experience with the functional design
requirements to see if the actual fluid conditions and number of cycles
in the original design documentation bounded the conditions the plant
experienced for each transient. If there were significant differences,
their impact on the reactor system must be evaluated.
Finally, any differences between the design transient descriptions
and the actual operating plant data must be resolved by refining the
design transient description. Since these descriptions constitute
functional requirements and are the bases for the reactor coolant system
stress report, the stress report must be reviewed and supplemented with
engineering evaluations and analyses (Tally, 1984).
A major problem with assessments of the functional requirements of
equipment in operating plants is lack of age-related testing or data to
support the ability of old equipment to operate for its design life.
Equipment qualification methods may be used, in the absence of age-
related design limits and bases for these limits, to determine the bases
for aging assessments and to forecast the ability of equipment to
perform at dates in the future through evaluation of present degradation
as compared to past history. Qualification methods generally consist
of:
(1) tests which subject equipment to the most severe adverse
environments expected to occur at the installed equipment
location and/or
(2) analyses which considers hazardous environments and their
potential for causing unacceptable failures of equipment.
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Typical adverse environmental parameters specified in testing or
analysis include: temperature, pressure, humidity and radiation. The
method used to evaluate the functional capability of the equipment is to
test the ability of the materials making up the equipment to function in
a given environment over a period of time. Resistance to ionizing
radiation, thermal rating, and corrosion resistance of materials are
often evaluated to determine the material status after exposure to
normal and adverse environments. The evaluation may be difficult since
exact materials of construction are often unknown to both the utility
performing the assessments and the manufacturers of the equipment
(Bader, 1982).
As discussed above, equipment design qualification may be used to
estimate plant status with respect to functional capability and to
forecast the ability of equipment to perform in the future (being aware
of the limitations of accelerated age testing). In addition, equipment
qualification may be used to formulate a qualified life for each piece
of equipment (amenable to qualification procedures) susceptible to age-
related degradation. A representative sample of the equipment is placed
in an aged condition, naturally or artifically, to simulate all
significant aging effects. Proper operation within its specified
service conditions results in qualification of the equipment for a
period of time. This time period is defined as the qualified life of
the equipment. For equipment with no significant aging mechanisms, its
qualified life is equal to its design life. The determination of
qualified life should be based on conservative engineering analysis
(IEEE, 1980).
5-5
The results of equipment qualification testing can partically make
up for our ignorance of the age-related design limits of equipment by
giving bases for aging assessments and yielding a qualified life for
which equipment was demonstrated to be functional for specified service
conditions. This and other testing methodologies should be investigated
by the utility for their usefulness in estimating the status of the
plant's equipment operability and for formulating age-related design
limits for various equipment.
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CHAPTER 6
IDENTIFYING AGING PROBLEMS AT THE PLANT STUDIED
6.1 Areas of Investigation
In previous chapters, technical issues regarding nuclear power
plant aging and life extension have been addressed with particular
emphasis on means of identifying components in the plant which may not
function properly because of age-related degradation. A question which
should be asked is what areas in the nuclear power plant are most
susceptible to age-related degradation. A representative nuclear power
plant was studied to answer this question. Four major areas were
considered for investigation: structural components of equipment,
mechanical equipment, electrical equipment (including instrumentation
and controls), and environmental aging effects.
6.2 Structural Components of Equipment
The first consideration must be given to the supporting structure
for all the systems and components in the plant. This includes the
building structure, auxiliary steel, supports for piping, air
conditioning ducts, cable pans, conduits, and other components and
equipment foundations. All safety-related items were designed for
accident (extreme loading) conditions, which provides a considerably
high margin of safety for normal operating conditions. The non-safety
items were also designed conservatively across the board. This high
margin of safety and the fact that they are seldom used caused these
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items to be least susceptible to aging due to fatigue, creep or rupture.
There are a few exceptions such as snubbers, heavy rotating-equipment
foundations, and foundations of heavy equipment connected to hot piping
systems such as heaters, heat exchangers, and condensers, which may be
subjected to fluctuating thermal loads. It is not known how many
thermal cycles these structures are capable of sustaining without
failing. The utility must establish an inspection and surveillance
program to monitor these items (NUSCO, 1984).
6.3 Mechanical Equipment
The second consideration was given to mechanical equipment and
components. The actual operating temperatures, pressures, loads and
mechanical and thermal stress levels were compared to the associated
values which were used as a design basis and found to be much lower.
The main costly problem which only affects a small, but important,
portion of piping and major equipment is material degradation due to
corrosion which may result in stress-corrosion cracking (NUSCO, 1984).
Experience in operating the plant studied has shown a number of
material degradation processes to have occurred in the steam generators.
In the design and licensing of the reactor, minor steam generator tube
inleakage was anticipated and was not considered a major safety concern.
However, widespread degradation that could lead to major leakage
developing from failure of a number of tubes during a design-basis
accident and result in significant release of radioactivity to the
environment is a potential safety concern (Bader, 1982).
The degradation processes that have occurred at the plant are
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wastage and tubing support plate corrosion. Wastage, or general
corrosion of the primary side tubing in creviced areas by acid
phosphates, has largely been eliminated by the abondonment of phosphate
water chemistry. Tube-support-plate corrosion or denting due to the non
protective magnetite growth on the carbon-steel support plate has been
triggered by the presence of chlorides, an acid environment and
oxidizing ions such as copper or nickel. In addition to producing dents
and deformation in the inconel tubes, leading to primary-side stress-
corrosion cracking, denting processes result in considerable distortion
and cracking of the tube-support plate as well. Proper oxygen control
or deaeration in the condenser and feedwater lines, as well as in the
steam generator, together with careful monitoring of condenser leakage
have appeared to be the best defense against denting reactions (Bader,
1982).
Although the older problems, such as denting and wastage have been
controlled, others that are slower to develop could become more evident
in the future. Two of the most important of these are intergranular
corrosion and stress-corrosion cracking in the alloy 600 tubes. In
intergranular corrosion, the boundaries between the tiny grains of metal
near the outer surface of a tube are slowly attacked by a process still
not fully understood. Stress corrosion cracking is a related phenomenon
that occurs when a surface exposed to a corrosive environment is also
subjected to tensile stress. Again, the process is not fully
understood, but cracking could begin on either the inside or the outside
of a tube (Douglas, 1984).
Opportunities for controlling steam generator corrosion and
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subsequent mechanical damage involve equipment modifications and
improved procedures in the secondary loop and especially in the
condenser cooling loop. The following plant modifications could be made
to minimize the potential for tube degradation in the future (Nutwell,
1983):
* Retubing and replacement of existing feedwater heaters and
moisture-separator/reheaters to eliminate sources of copper-
bearing materials in heat exchangers, which have contributed to
tube denting.
* Replacement of copper/nickel and aluminum alloy tubes in the
existing condensers with titanium tubes.
* Installation of a demineralized-water storage system to provide
high quality water to the steam generators for use during
scheduled shutdown, startup, and hot-standby operations.
With all treatments of corrosion in steam generators there are
uncertainties and utilities need to know the answers to many questions
to ensure the safe continued operation of the plant. Some unanswered
questions are:
(1) How is degradation progressing following remedial action?
(2) Have remedial actions taken to correct one type of degradation
introduced possibly a second one?
(3) What water chemistry controls really are satisfactory to
ensure reliability and safety?
Utilities should continue investigation of steam generator
corrosion problems to answer these questions.
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6.4 Electrical Equipment and Instrumentation (NUSCO, 1984)
The structural parts of safety-related electrical equipment such as
panels, boards, cable pans, and conduits have been designed for extreme
loading conditions and degradation or potential failures are not
expected to be a concern for extended life operation. The utility
engineers think that electric insulation, cables, devices and
instrumentation may present a problem. Preventive measures and/or
replacement will be required by the utility for insulation and cables.
However, replacement in the same manner that is routinely done will be
required for devices and instrumentation.
6.5 Environmental Aging Effects (CYAPC, Docket 50-213)
Based on the present licensing requirement, all nuclear plants have
to have some level of environmental qualification for all safety-related
equipment. This results in establishing the qualified life of each
piece of safety-related equipment. At the plant the qualified life for
each electrical equipment item which is required to function in a harsh
environment must be determined. Harsh environments are the result of
loss of cooling accident or high energy line break inside containment.
All harsh environment equipment is included in the surveillance and
maintenance programs to detect unexpected age-related degradation.
Some of the generic electrical equipment items which are included
in the qualification program and the schedule for preventive maintenance
for each item are listed in Table 6.1. The majority of the surveillance
and preventive maintenance which is done on this equipment is currently
performed on a periodic basis. The surveillance and preventive
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TABLE 6.1
Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance of Equipment Located
in a Harsh Environment.
Source: (CYAPC, Docket 50-213)
Generic Equipment Period
4 KV Motors
480 Volt Motors
Motor Operators
Solenoid Valves
Limit Switches
Instrumentation
Transmitters
Radiation Detectors
Pressure Switches
Acellerometer
Each Refueling
Each Refueling
5 Years
3 Years
2 Years
Each Refueling
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maintenance procedures include visual inspections, where applicable, to
observe any indications of postulated aging degradations. In those
equipment where accelerated aging was included in the harsh environment
testing program, such as with cables, visual inspection may be the only
surveillance performed on a regular basis.
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CHAPTER 7
OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES IN
NUCLEAR PLANT LONGEVITY XTKENSION
7.1 Maintenance of Pressure Boundary Integrity
Changes in reactor vessel material properties may occur during
plant life due to environemntal effects. In particular, the embrittling
effects of fast neutron irradiation on reactor vessel steels could pose
a serious problem for utilities in any life extension program. Neutron
bombardments can generate imperfections or defects in the regular array
of atoms in crystalline solids. The accumulation of radiation damage
over time results in the loss of ductility of the metal.
Annealing may be used partially to restore the ductility of a
metal. Annealing is a process of heating a metal to a sufficiently high
temperature (usually higher than one-third the absolute melting point)
for long enough time to produce the desired mechanical, physical or
other properties. A well-annealed metal is stable against any further
metallurgical changes which might be thermally induced during service.
The recovery of ductility by this process is an important phenomenon
from the practical standpoint that it may be possible to repair reactor
pressure vessels by periodic annealing. There seems to be a clear
incentive for utilities to begin practical consideration of how large
reactor vessels might be annealed (Smallman, 1970).
However, there are drawbacks of in-place annealing of the reactor
pressure vessel. The effectiveness of annealing has not been
demonstrated yet. Furthermore, even if annealing proves to be effective
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in removing radiation damage, it is not known how the vessel would be
repaired with the primary shield concrete in the way. Another drawback
is the lack of space in the containment to perform the repair. Finally,
the thermally-induced residual stresses which might be created in the
metal sections within the thermal gradient zone of the annealing
boundary could become serious new concerns.
In addition to embrittlement of reactor vessel steels, another
threat to the integrity of the pressure boundary is fatigue. Fatigue
may be characterized as a progressive failure phenomenon that proceeds
by the initiation and propagation of cracks to an unstable size as a
result of application of fluctuating loads over a period of time. The
pressurizer, pressure vessel and primary piping are subject to large,
cyclic thermal stresses which together with the stresses from fluid-
structural interactions and vibration could result in thermal fatigue of
these components. Since practically all fatigue failures start at
surfaces, there is a constant need to guard against creation of
imperfections in the surfaces of pressure-boundary components by using
the most advanced testing methods to detect the slightest material
degradation in these components. Liquid penetrant tests are often
useful non-destructive evaluation methods to check for surface defects,
and for subsurface defects with surface openings.
7.2. Experience with Component Replacements (Nutwell, 1983)
To extend the service life of nuclear power plants it will be
important to be able to demonstrate the feasibility of replacements and
to ensure that radiation exposures to personnel would be kept low. An
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important component that could need to be replaced in order to extend
the life of the plant is the steam generator. The reason for this is
that steam generator tube leaks cannot be preventively plugged
indefinitely; for every tube that is preventively plugged, the number of
remaining tubes allowed to be plugged (a design margin provided by the
NSSS vendor) decreases. The experience of utilities with replacing and
repairing degraded steam generators is useful for other utilities which
may face the same problem. In particular, changes in past repair
schedules and construction techniques may help utilities reduce total
downtime.
Several years of detailed planning of construction activities
usually preceded actual replacement of steam generators. Initially,
design studies were performed to identify modifications needed inside
the containment for replacement of the steam generators. These studies
included identification of equipment, piping and cable to be removed,
location of cut lines for removal of concrete floor slabs and shield
walls, and evaluation of existing structural steel for new loads imposed
by temporary equipment. To assist in the studies a scale model of the
containment was built. The model helped to determine the feasibility of
various rigging schemes and was used to identify the structure and
equipment that had to be removed from the containment to provide
sufficient laydown areas and work space.
An important concern in the replacement effort was reducing the
radiation exposure to workers. Studies were made of tasks associated
with the repair to assess the radiation exposures anticipated (Nutwell,
1983). These tasks were then reviewed for possible changes that would
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reduce the associated doses. Low-level radiation areas were identified
and posted inside the containment to provide workers with low-exposure
rest areas. In addition, decontamination or shielding techniques were
considered for application in areas of frequent use.
Before work could begin on replacing the steam generators, a number
of changes had to be made inside the containment. Insulation was
removed from steam generators and connected piping. Portions of piping
attached to each steam generator were removed. An equipment hatch
trolley was installed in the hatch to ferry equipment and materials.
After the changes were made, the steam generators were cut apart and new
components were installed.
A review of the replacement experience suggested a number of
changes in the construction techniques for future repairs. Installing
pedestal cranes earlier in the outage can eliminate conflicting needs
for the use of the polar crane. In addition, upgrading the auxiliary
hook on the polar crane could simplify the rigging scheme for inverting
the steam generator upper assemblies. These changes and other
adjustments are expected to reduce total downtime required for future
repairs (Nutwell, 1983).
7.3 Plant Improvements
Successful life extension of aged nuclear power plants will
probably require changes in existing plant equipment and the addition of
new equipment to maintain the operability of aged equipment. Some of
the major improvements to be considered include:
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(1) secondary-system improvement to forestall future steam-
generator degradation
(2) plant changes to prepare for effective management of outages
of major repairs
(3) improved maintenance and surveillance of critical plant
components, particularly the pressure boundary, and
(4) additional instrumentation, such as detectors and sensors, for
early identification of system degradation
Top-priority remedies for controlling steam generator corrosion are
likely to be condenser retubing, a maintenance program to minimize
subsequent leakage there, and feedwater heater retubing with ferrous
alloys. One of the key findings of research on steam generator
corrosion is that much lower levels of ions and dissolved oxygen in the
steam generator water are required to prevent corrosion than was
previously thought. The condenser is one of the principal sources of
ionic impurities in the secondary water loop when steam is cooled after
passing through a turbine. The condenser system, as well as parts of
the turbine system and feedwater system develop leaks which draw in
oxygen, a corrosive element when combined with other contaminants. By
retubing the condenser and prevention of air leaks through proper
maintenance, the purity of the water can be improved and corrosion
reduced. Also, to further minimize the potential for degradation of
steam generator tubes in the future, existing feedwater heaters and
moisture separators may be replaced to eliminate sources of copper-
bearing materials in heat-exchangers. Copper salts are soluble in water
and accelerate corrosion even in low concentrations. (Douglas, 1984)
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Plant changes can be made to prepare a utility for effective
management of outages for major component replacments and repairs. A
maintenance building can be erected to give construction personnel
access to the radiation-control area and a clothing-change facility. A
new computer system may be installed to improve health-physics control
over radiation exposure of all personnel entering and leaving the
radiation-control area. To store the large amount of repair materials
involved in repairs and for associated plant changes, a large warehouse
may be built and a computerized inventory-control system may be
installed. (Nutwell, 1983).
As plants age, the use of improved maintenance and surveillance of
equipment become more important due to several factors including reduced
equipment reliability, parts availability and increased unscheduled
outage frequency. Condition monitoring of electrical equipment such as
batteries, generators, cables, motors, circuit breakers and transmitters
is important in order to maintain the safety of the plant. Heavy
rotating equipment should be monitored to detect bearing wear; vibration
monitoring could be used for this equipment. More frequent calibration
checks should be made on instruments to detect instrument drift. To
improve nondestructive examination of steam generator tubes, the use of
multifrequency eddy current techniques should be encouraged. This
allows assessment of tube integrity and the presence of denting. The
thermal sleeves of the pressurizer should be monitored to detect surface
cracks before fatigue failure occurs due to theraml cycling.
Finally, additional instrumentation may be installed to detect age-
related degradation and for obtaining plant operating data important in
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defining age-related design limits. Instrumentation will be needed to
indicate the stresses imposed on pressure boundary components including
mechanical, thermal and radiation stesses. Improved instrumentation may
be installed for monitoring water purity and oxygen content in the
secondary-system water. Equipment will be needed to detect the effects
of flow-induced vibration and neutron irradiation on reactor internals.
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CHAPTER 8
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN PLANT LIFK-EXTENSION
8.1 Important Instiutions Affecting Life Extension
Nuclear power stations are regulated by several federal and state
agencies. The most important, and their respective spheres of action
are the following:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): Public safety and
environmental impacts.
State Public Utilities Commission (PUC): Electricity pricing.
State Energy Facilities Siting Council: Land use and
environmental effects.
Most of the following discussion is focused upon the role of the NRC as
its influence in the various areas of station operation is pervasive.
Further, its approval of extended life operation is essential.
No nuclear power station has yet reached the expiration date of
its operating license (OL), although some stations have been shut down
prior to that point (e.g., Indian Point 1, Humbolt Bay, Dresden 1,
Shippingport). All but the most recently built plants have recieved
OL's of 40 years duration, beginning from the date of Construction
Permit (CP) issuance. Thus, the effective operating life allowed under
such licenses has been approximately 30 years, reflecting the fact that
approximately ten years has typically been required for plant
construction.
The current NRC practice is to issue new OL's for 40 years from
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the time of commercial operation. This has been done under a
re-interpretation of existing regulations, and does not recognize newly
information regarding the practical operating life of a power station.
For that matter, the 40 year OL duration is not based upon any clearly
stated physical plant design limitation.
For plants having OL's with durations which commenced at the date
of CP issuance, an application for an extension of the OL duration
instead of a date 40 years after fuel loading would be equivalent to a
request to be treated on the same basis as the most recently licensed
plants. The likelihood that such a request would be treated favorably
would be strengthened by the existence of a set of plants already being
treated as would be requested. Alternatively, a utility could request
extension of the OL for a different duration.
At this point, it is impossible to know how such a request would
be treated. This is because no power station license extension has yet
been requested from the NRC, and because the NRC has not yet
established a policy regarding the decision criteria governing such
requests. Such requirements as exist are summarized in Table 8.1. In
the work of this project, discussions were held with NRC staff members
dealing with either the licensing or research aspects of plant aging.
This was done in order to be able to characterize current positions and
policy trends of the NRC in this area. Briefly stated, very little has
or is about to happen in the definition of an NRC position regarding
nuclear power plant longevity extension. The current NRC schedule
envisions formulation of a policy on OL extension by about 1990,
providing that resources for such a formulation becomes available.
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Consequently, in the near term, it will remain necessary to speculate
upon how requests for OL extensions would be treated by the NRC.
The focus of relevant NRC activities to-date have been in the
areas of plant aging effects, research reactor OL extensions, and
special treatment of the oldest power stations. The concern with plant
aging has been focused upon anticipation of age related plant safety
degradation on a time scale which could be shorter than a plant's OL.
Primary concern with safety related organic materials degradation,
electrical and electronic system degradation, embrittlement and
fatigue. Activity in this area is likely to become stronger and to
become a long term program. It will likely be most useful in the
context of longevity extension in identifying important age related
safety problems and in improving the body of knowledge concerning age
related component degradation.
The NRC experience in extending the OL's of research reactors is
summarized in Table 8.2. A license extension may be granted upon
receipt of a request for extension at least 30 days prior to the OL
expiration date. Examination of the technical case for such an
extension and holding of public hearings may occur after the OL
expiration date, while the reactor continues to operate. Such
extensions have routinely been granted with research reactors in the
past. In such extensions public hearings have been the exception, and
have only been held to deal with actions by public intervenors.
Notably, power reactor CP extensions have been granted in a similar
fashion.
An important question for power reactors is that of how revised
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safety requirements would be treated for older reactors. The research
reactor precedent is not useful for this question as safety
requirements have not changed significantly over the lives of these
units. In the areas of quality assurance, record keeping and security,
increased requirements have been imposed on all such reactors. It
appears that the intensity of re-examination of old safety related
questions in research reactor license extensions depend strongly upon
the prior operating record of the reactor. Reactors which appear to be
well staffed and managed and with few licensee event reports also
appear to be granted greater trust for future operation. This trend
probably constitutes an important lesson for power reactor operators,
in that a history of competent, event-free operation should provide
safety regulators with a stronger basis for use of discretion in the
judgement of safety requirements than otherwise.
Experience to-date with the NRC's Systematic Evaluation Program
may provide some guidance regarding how evolving safety requirements
would be applied to older nuclear power stations. That program has
focused upon the oldest dozen of the large LWR plants, to determine
where equipment modifications should be made in order to maintain
safety levels consistent with those of the newer plants. Tools used in
performing this assessment have been benefit-cost analysis and
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The former assessment has involved
a comparison of expected safety improvement benefits to the costs of
implementation. This is important because of the NRC's recognition of
the high costs of implementation of design changes in an existing plant
as a factor in the decision of whether such changes should be
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required. The use of PRA has been important in trying to focus the
resources to be used for safety improvements upon the largest
contributors to public risk. The same tools are available to utilities
in assessing where plant improvements are worthwhile, and for
justifying the decisions reached to the NRC.
The most difficult area of safety regulation to be dealt with
concerns problems where benefit-cost analysis indicates that a plant
modification is not justified, but where PRA indicates that a
potentially important, previously unrecognized, contributor to risk
exists. Important examples of such problems arise in the various
external events which may imitate accidents and/or disable systems
important to safety. In the areas of seismic events, floods, tornadoes
and explosions, safety standards have become much more stringent over
the 'past 25 years. It may be economically prohibitive for existing
plants to meet current criteria, yet public safety protection may
require such satisfaction. If the utility suspects the existence of
such a situation it may be prudent to undertake early discussions with
the NRC in order to obtain an early resolution in order to have a sound
basis upon which to plan longevity extension programs.
The implication of this discussion is that if a utility wishes to
extend the life of a plant it is possible to enhance the probability of
success by early establishment of a program for continual plant
improvement. This program should have the goals of reliable operation,
improvement of public safety and protection of the owner's investment.
These three goals are mutually supportive. Their pursuit requires
examination throughout the plant of potentially important systems and
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components. The important point, however, is the need for starting
such a program as soon as possible. Successful life extension is far
more likely to be achieved under a program to maximize the plants
operational longevity than one which is focused upon getting the plant
into a minimal condition sufficient to obtain an extended OL.
It should be expected that preparation of a new Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) would be required for an OL extension. The policy is
currently undefined, but it is also prudent to prepare a new
Environmental Report (ER). Preparation of the former would likely be
more difficult than the latter. With the SAR, a focus upon age related
safety problems would be expected. Often such problems are badly
defined, and the technical basis for their resolution is not always
available. In preparation of a new ER the utility would have the
benefit of knowledge of environmental effects in the plant neighborhood
which would have been observed over the plant's prior operating life.
Capturing this benefit requires that adequate records be kept in order
to document such environmental effects. However, establishment of the
required records should be consistent with the type of environmental
monitoring routinely required of an operating nuclear plant.
8.2 The First Decade of Extended Plant Life
For most operating nuclear power stations the operating license
has been issued for a duration of 40 years, measured from the date of
issuance of the construction period. Because the plant construction
duration is typically in the neighborhood of a decade, the practical
lifetime of the OL is actually approximately 30 years.
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During the past two years, however, the NRC has been issuing 40
year OL's with durations which commence with commercial operation.
Effectively the OL duration of these more recently licensed plants is
approximately ten years greater than that for the previously licensed
units. This recent precedent then raises the likelihood that the
plants with the older style OL's will easily be able to have their
termination dates extended to a point 40 years beyond the debut of
commercial operation. As no plant has yet applied for such an
extension it is currently unknown whether this conjecture is correct.
However, if it is correct, one of the major uncertainties, that of
regulatory instability associated with longevity extension for the
current generation of plants will be effectively eliminated. This is
because the regulatory action involved for an older plant would be that
of re-interpretation of existing regulations rather than that of
creation and implementation of a new set of regulations, as would be
required for extension of the duration of an expiring OL. The
prospects for utility success in requesting the former type of action
would be expected to be much greater than with the latter.
If such an action were successful, most of the expected future
economic benefits of longevity extension would be within reach. This
is because the net present worth of future benefits which cannot be
captured until after ten years is likely to be less than that of the
benefits available during the first ten years of extended operation.
With continuous compounding at a rate, X, the net present worth of
benefits, b, which cannot be captured until time, t, in the future is
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equal to be-At. Similarly, the net present worth, B(tl,t2) of
benefits accrued between future times t and t2 is given as,
B(tl,t2) =I b() -AXt' dt (8.1)
tl
For b(t ) being constant, as would be the case with a base-loaded
nuclear power station, the net present worth of accumulated discounted
benefits is given as,
B(tl,t 2) = b (e Xtl e -Xt 2) (8.2)
A quantity of interest is the ratio of the net present worth of
benefits accumulated from the present to time, t, to the worth of
benefits accumulated from time, t, until a time of infinity. This
ratio is given as,
R(t) = eXt 1 (8.3)
For X = 0.069 this ratio is equal to unity. Stated differently, for a
discount rate greater than 7% annually, all net benefits accrued after
ten years of extended operating life are smaller than those accrued
during the first 10 years of extended life. The current real discount
rate is approximately 8% (12% for the opportunity cost of money, less
4% for general inflation). At this rate of discounting, the value of R
(10 years) is 1.23 (i.e., 55% of all future benefits would be captured
during the first decade of extended life). Consequently, it may be
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judged that the likelihood is low that safety regulatory impediments
would create a significant barrier to economically attractive nuclear
power station longevity extension. This is because any justified
investment in plant life extension would be able to be recovered in
only a few years as long as interest rates typical of recent years
continue to obtain.
8.3 Extended Life After the First Decade
The natural limits which would determine the lifetime of a nuclear
power plant are not obvious. Conceivably, plant life could be much
greater than forty years. Thus, the questions which must be faced by
the regulatory authorities in permitting continued operation for an
indefinite term are of interest.
Under existing regulations, operation of a nuclear power station
for more than 40 years does not require issuance of a new OL upon
termination of the initial license. Rather, exercising existing
authority, the NRC may extend a current OL indefinitely. It is
required that application for such an extension be recieved at least 30
days prior to expiration of the current license. Upon such an
application, the NRC is allowed to permit continued operation beyond
expiration of an OL, while the examination of whether a license
extension should be granted is conducted.
What is currently unknown is what requirements and procedures
would govern NRC decision making in granting such an extension. No
such OL extension has ever been asked, or granted. No programs exist
currently within the NRC to define the detailed requirements for
granting of an OL extension. Consequently, the current uncertainty
regarding future such NRC requirements can be expected to persist for
many years more.
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Existing NRC programs relating to plant aging:
The NRC has established a program in the Division of Research
focused upon problems of plant aging. This is the activity most
relevant to the technical requirements which would govern granting of
future OL extensions. This effort has been concerned with age related
deterioriation of the plant in ways which could affect safety, with an
emphasis upon problems likely to become important before expiration of
the initial operating license.
Items recieving most attention are summarized in Table 8.4. It is
seen that degradation of systems involving hydrocarbon based materials
and of materials exposed to nuclear radiation are of special concern.
These problems have been reflected strongly in utility programs on
plant aging to-date. This may indicate that such programs may not yet
have been formulated systematically in anticipation of future problems,
but rather in reaction to previous NRC concerns.
It is likely that the NRC plant aging program will grow, as the
current plant population ages. As this occurs, the role of this
program in influencing plant aging strategies by utilities is likely to
remain large. At the time of this writing, the important directions of
future concerns have been identified by the NRC staff as concerning
reactor vessel embrittlement, electrical insulation degradation,
organic seal deterioriation and electronic instrumentation
unreliability.
It is important to recognize that the full range of age related
plant problems of potential interest to a utility is greater than that
identified by the NRC. However, the ability of the NRC to insist upon
high priority attention to its concerns often has the effect of
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distorting the emphasis placed by an organization upon different
issues.
8.4 Uncertainties of License Extension
In requesting a license extension, major areas of uncertainty
include the following:
* The degree to which "grandfathering" would be permitted in
exempting an old plant from certain current regulations,
* Whether public hearings would be required for extension of a
license, and the degree to which the procedures for such an
extension would approach those for issuance of a new license,
* Whether preparation of a revised Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
and Environmental Statement (ES) would be required.
It is impossible to predict the resolution of any of these
questions. Regarding "grandfathering", the NRC has an inconsistent
record. However, the arguments for exemption of a plant from a
particular requirement become weaker as the future duration during
which the plant is expected to operate increases. Consequently, it
appears prudent to maiatain the plant in a state as closely in
compliance with current regulations as is economically feasible if it
is desired to obtain indefinite future operation.
Concerning whether public hearings would be required for a license
extension, much would depend upon whether such an extension were
defined as a license amendment. Under the terms of the "Sholly"
amendment, a public hearing may be required upon public intervention in
connection with any amendment of a plant's OL. It appears likely that
at least the first few future OL extensions would be contested.
Consequently, it would probably be prudent to expect a request for an
OL extension to be contested and to require public hearings.
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A final area of uncertainty concerns the documentation which would
be required for an OL extension. The documentation of new safety
issues to be resolved would likely be addressed in a revision to the
FSAR, much as the FSAR represents an extension of the Preliminary
Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). In this mode, it would not be necessary
for the Ammended FSAR to address again issues which would have been
treated previously in the original FSAR. Concerning the ES, things are
less clear. This is because the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which requires that an Environmental Statement be prepared, has
never been interpreted with respect to an OL extension. Among the most
important questions yet to be answered are whether a new or revised ES
would be required in connection with an OL extension, and what the
scope of such an ES would be. Such questions are usually answered
through formulation of a proposed policy by the NRC and refinement of
that policy through judicial review. This process is likely to be
contentious and can require several years for completion, during which
uncertainty can be expected to reign.
8.5 Possible Actions by the NRC
The greatest contribution which could be made to facilitate the OL
extension process would be for the NRC to formulate policy in the
following two areas:
* Concerning requirements for conversion of an OL which has
commenced from the start of plant construction into an OL
commencing from the start of fuel loading, and
* Concerning requirements, including the points addressed
previously, for OL extension.
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Until this is done, the process of judicial review of these policies
cannot be initiated. Such a review could be started after formulation
of a policy by an individual utility requesting a license extension,
since such a request presumably would trigger any challenges by public
intervenors to the extension process. It is important that this
process be started early in order that it may become stabilized before
it becomes urgently needed.
8.6 The Roles of Agencies Other Than The NRC
As is mentioned previously, many governmental organizations other
than the NRC may play important roles in nuclear plant life extension.
Any organization which issues a permit needed for operation of a plant
may potentially block plant life extension through failure to extend
the life of an existing permit. Typically, 50 such organizations might
be involved with a single plant. The roles of several potentially
important agencies are discussed subsequently.
The Public Utility Commission (PUC) is potentially important
because of its role in deciding which investments connected with a
plant may be allowed into the rate base. It will be necessary to
convince the PUC that any investments for plant life extension are
prudent in that they will confer net benefits upon electricity
consumers. A major obstacle to such a demonstration is likely to be
the uncertainty currently associated with obtaining extension of a
plant's OL.
Many states have agencies which oversee siting of energy
facilities. Typically, they will issue a limited duration permit for
use of a site by a nuclear power station with terms consistent with
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those of the NRC's OL. The agreement of such an agency to extend the
life of operation would usually be necessary. In order to obtain such
cooperation it would be necessary to show that such operation would be
to the net benefit of the inhabitants of the state.
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Table 8.1
Requirements for Extension of Operating License
Requirement:
License amendment for extended operation.
Public Hearings:
Not required.
Public Notice:
Required.
Filing for Extension:
Required > 30 days prior to license expiration.
Safety Review by NRC:
May proceed in parallel with extended operation.
Relevant Experience:
Research reactor OL extensions.
Power reactor CP extensions.
8-15
Table 8.2
Research Reactor OL Extensions
Public Hearings:
Usually not required (only upon intervention).
Cases with Hearings:
UCLA (safety, sabotage)
GE Test Reactor (seismic)
AFFRE
Safety Review:
De Novo review required.
Revised Safety Requirements:
Imposed during plant life, not at time of license extension.
Detail of Safety Review:
Depends upon prior operational, equipment-experience.
Relicensing Ratchets:
Operation and maintenance QA.
Emergency planning.
Power Reactor CP Extensions:
* None have required hearings.
* Most have been routinely granted.
* All have required safety reviews.
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TABLE 8.3
Net Present Worth of Future Benefits
Net Discounted
Value R(t-10 yrs.)
Ratio of Benefits
Captured Before
t-10 yrs. to Benefits Time
Captured after t10 yrs. R(t) =
0.49
0.65
0.82
1.01
1.23
1.46
1.72
2.0
2.32
2.67
3.06
3.48
3.95
4.47
5.05
5.69
6.39
at Which Time at Which
0.5 (yr) R(t) 1.0 (yr)
10.13
8.10
6.75
5.79
5.06
4.50
4.05
3.68
3.38
3.12
2.89
2.70
2.53
2.38
2.25
2.13
2.03
17.33
13.86
11.55
9.90
8.66
7.70
6.93
6.30
5.78
5.34
4.96
4.63
4.34
4.08
3.85
3.65
3.47
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Compound
Interest
Rate, X
(yra,
.04
.05
.06
.07
.08
.09
.10
.11
.12
.13
.14
.15
.16
.17
.18
.19
.20
I ~ I I I ~ ~ ~ -
Table 8.4
Age Related Technical Issues of Interest
in Current NRC Program
* Reactor pressure vessel embrittlement
* Intergranular stress corrosion in primary system piping
* Degradation of electrical insulation
* Degradation of electronic systems
* Degradation of organic seals
* Steam generator tube wear and fatigue
* Thermal fatigue within primary system
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CHAPTER 9
COSTS AND ENEFITS OF
PLANT LIFE EXTENSION
In deciding whether to pursue plant life extension, it is
necessary to perform a cost-benefit analysis. This must be done in
order to determine the point at which marginal investments in plant
improvements would become unjustified.
Such an analysis is needed for each of the following intervals of
life extension:
* Until expiration of the original plant OL.
* Until expiration of a revised OL at 40 years after issuance of
the initial plant OL.
* After extension of the OL duration beyond 40 years.
9.1 Time Horizon Effects
As the time horizon for analysis is extended outward, the level of
detail possible and necessary in the analysis decreases. The objective
of each analysis is to identify the priority of actions which should be
undertaken in the near future in order to avoid a loss of capacity at a
date further into the future. As the analytical time horizon increases
the magnitude of a future capacity loss necessary to justify a given
level of current expenditure grows monotonically. Thus, the number of
potential causes of lost future capacity which are important enough to
be of concern will decrease as the time increases into the future at
which the capacity would be lost.
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Consequently, the inteval of greatest interest for life extension
planning is that from the present until expiration of the plants
initial OL.
9.2 Scope of Planning
To this point, the major focus of nuclear industry efforts for
plant life extension has been on complying with NRC requirements which
anticipate age-related degradation of safety during the current OL of a
plant, and with repairing unanticipated age-related component failures
(e.g., removal of the thermal sleeve, which failed from fatigue, within
the reactor vessel of the Milestone 2 power station). Future efforts
will have to anticipate the full range of possible age-related
failures, and work to prevent them. The vast majority of such failures
would lead to impairment of the economic performance of a plant, but
would be unimportant with respect to public safety. Consequently, the
criteria for allocation of resources for achieving longevity increases
must be reexamined. To-date, such critera have been primarily those of
public safety protection, and have been prescribed by the NRC. In the
future , the set of important criteria must be much larger, should
encompass those of the NRC; but must be oriented toward maximizing
economic performance. For an existing plant such maximization
corresponds to maximizing reliability. Consequently, the task of
longevity extension becomes that of compiling a list of components and
systems in the plant which are important from the perspective both of
reliability and safety, the performance of which would be expected to
become impaired or interrupted over time. Such a list is likely to
encompass most of the systems of the plant, and the most important
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entries on it are discussed previously. Then, for each such component
a strategy which mixes means of preventing such degradation and of
monitoring for incipient component or system impairment must be devised
and implemented. Doing this is laborious, but straightforward.
Inevitably, because of resource limitations it will be necessary
to rank in priority the alternative problems to be pursued. The proper
tool for such a ranking is a probabalistic reliability assessment. In
such an assessment, the event paths leading to altered reliability must
be identified, including paths where incremental component performance
degradation, rather than complete failure occurs. Then, the
probabilities, the different paths, and their age-dependencies, must be
quantified. From this process, it should be possible to identify the
leading contributors to unavailability, and those which would be
expected to become important over time. From such an identification,
the high-priority components and systems which deserve special emphasis
in a longevity increase program will become apparent.
This analytical process is conceptually straightforward, and much
of the foundation for it has been created in the form of probabilistic
risk assessment. The major future development efforts which are needed
are the following:
* Definition of the methodology to be employed to the point that
implementation is justified (this task consists of an extension
of current probabilistic risk analysis methods), and
* Formulation of a database useful in probabalistic reliability
assessment (this task is large and more difficult than has been
the case with probabilistic risk assessment).
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With such a tool it should be possible to estimate the economic
benefit of investment in plant improvement. Such an investment would
appear as the equivalent capital value of plant capacity, which would
be increased through increased availability. From knowledge of such
benefits, the breakeven level of present investment can be estimated,
and the priority ranking of alternative investments can be achieved.
It would be valuable to have such estimates available today, since it
appears to be indicated strongly that current levels of investment in
plant longevity extension are substantially suboptimal. From this
discussion, it is apparent that maximization of plant life extension is
equivalent to maximization of temporally-averaged plant availability
into the indefinite future.
A secondary benefit of plant life extension, in addition to those
of continued electricity production, is avoidance of the need to
decommission the plant. The associated costs of decommissioning can be
substantial, having been estimated previously to be in the range of
$200 to $700 per MWe (stated in 1985 dollars). In addition to
deferring such economic costs, plant longevity extension also permits
deferral of the tasks of decommissioning, such as physical demolation,
decontamination and of the associated permitting processes.
Further, just as extending the lives of a given set of plants
obviates the need to build new plants, such life extension ultimately
reduces the number of old plants which must be decommissioned.
9.3 Costs of Life Extension
In addition to the direct costs of hardware investments for life
extension it is necessary to invest in development of analyses of life
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extension strategies and in development of tools for performance of
such analyses. These investments are in the class of research
investments, where their benefits are potentially available to many
other parties without regard to whether they might have participated in
the costs of development. The development of the needed analytical
tools may be aided by arrangements either to spread their costs over
many potential users of the tools or to restrict the use of the tools
to those who would have funded the development. These considerations
are important as it appears that the costs of development of the needed
database may exceed several tens of millions of dollars.
In addition to the costs of analyses upon which life extension
decisions would be based, another major element of life extension cost
is that of obtaining an OL extension. As is discussed previously, such
extensions may be obtained initially to a new expiration date which is
40 years after the start of operation, and later for an indefinite
duration. Especially for the first few plants to seek an OL extension
the costs of preparing the required documentation and of the public
hearings, which are likely to be part of any OL extension approval
process, are also likely to be large.
9.4 Benefits of Plant Longevity Extension
The ultimate question in plant life extension is that of whether
the most economical way of providing electricity during a future
interval is by means of the plant in question. The major alternatives
for such a generation include use of a different plant, building a new
plant, and conservation. The value of life extension and the factor
which motivates its use is not that of the electricity generated during
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extended life. Rather, it is the difference in cost of generating such
energy between use of the extended life plant and the next most
attractive alternative for such generation.
Consequently, evaluation of the attractiveness of plant life
extension requires knowledge of the economics of generation of the most
attractive alternative technologies.
As an example, if the net cost of electricity derived from plant
life extension were equal to that of building a new plant, then, there
would exist no explicit economic incentive to provide such generation
through life extension. Rather, the decision regarding which route to
follow would depend upon such subjective factors as the expected ease
of licensing, the local political climate, attitudes among members of
the State Public Utilities Commission and expectations regarding the
future behavior of plant cost variables.
The major cost factors favoring plant life extension are that the
plant in question would already be in operation, with all of the prior
problems of siting, licensing, and construction having been resolved,
and the costs of construction having been incurred. Thus, the
principal attraction of plant life extension is the ability to avoid
such costs and their associated uncertainties.
A secondary benefit of plant life extension is the ability to
avoid decommissioning of the plant. The direct economic costs of
decommissioning can be large and highly uncertain. Decommissioning can
also involve significant occupational radiological exposures.
Currently the regulatory policies regarding the schedule and
constraints of decommissioning and regarding how decommissioning shall
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be financed, are undetermined. They are also, likely to remain
undetermined into the forseeable future. Consequently, the incentives
are strong to avoid undertaking such a decommissioning until the
relevant policies have been established by the precedent of prior
decommissioning of at least a single plant. Even after the relevant
policy has been established, the incentives will remain strong to defer
the expenses of decommissioning as long as possible.
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CQAPTER 10
SUMMARY: STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR PFOER
PLANT LIFE EXTENSION
10.1 Overview
From the preceeding discussion it is apparent that nuclear power
station life extension encompasses the entire plant and that it has no
clearly visible termination date. For the typical plant much less
investment plant monitoring and planning for life extension is being
done than appears to be optimal. The strategy for life extension which
emerges from the preceeding discussion would emphasize the following
elements:
* Planning as if the plant would operate into the indefinite
future
* Formulating a full plant program of system upgrading,
monitoring, maintenance, and performance forecasting
* Development of a plant specific probabilistic reliability
analysis, and use of this analysis as the basis of management
planning for longevity increases
* Bringing the plant into compliance, to the degree feasible,
with current NRC safety requirements
* Building a record of reliable trouble free plant performance as
a basis for justifying permission from the NRC and from society
for continued operation.
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A plant life extension plan embodying these elements would be far more
comprehensive and far looking than any in existence currently. It
would also be more costly initially, but ultimately more rewarding.
It is expected that the life extension program would focus
initially upon the most vulnerable parts of the plant such as organic
components and the reactor pressure vessel. Later, as resources would
permit, the scope of interest would become broadened until the entire
plant would be included.
10.2 Major Conclusions Regarding Age-Related Plant Degradation
Concerning the age-related degradation of a plant the major
conclusions of this study are the following:
* Age-related design limits for various components are not
indicated in the literature received from the utility and do
not appear to be easily available from the equipment vendor.
* Organic materials such as those in electrical insulation,
cables and instrumentation are most susceptible to aging
effects.
* Material degradation due to corrosion is the main costly
age-related problem affecting a small but important portion of
mechanical equipment (eg. steam generators, piping).
* Changing fuel loading designs can mitigate the age-related
degradation of the reactor pressure vessel due to neutron
irradiation.
* Practices which have lead to successful operation of fossil
plants for an extended lifetime may be used to establish a
basis for extending the operating life of nuclear plants.
* The effects of neutron irradiation and flow-induced vibration
on reactor core structure and internals is not accurately known
and should be investigated in more depth.
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* Age-related design limits can be given in terms of the
following stress level mechanisms:
* fatigue - due to cycling
* wear -erosion of material
* radiation - deterioration of molecular structures
* temperature - threshold limits create material
deterioration
* Trending of equipment failures and individual part degradation
assists the maintenance control activity in performing both
failure and extended-life analyses.
* Effective spare parts management is essential for plant life
extension as it assures the availability of spare parts when
needed.
* Condition monitoring is an effective way of meeting regulatory
requirements, maintaining qualification status, and improving
the reliability of equipment.
* In most electrical equipment, the limiting components are made
of plymeric materials and they age because of thermal
degradation.
* The transient logging program allows important trends in plant
operating history to be observed and corrective action taken
before key components are significantly degraded.
* A comprehensive assessment of nuclear power plant component
operating histories, maintenance histories, and design and
fabrication details is essential to understanding aging
phenomena.
* To assure high plant availability during extended life
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operation, the following steps may be taken:
* Introducing redundant back-up systems to chronic-problem
systems in order to avoid outage time.
* Modification of plant arrangements to allow a system to be
maintained with a plant at power.
* Optimizing space allowances for maintenance efforts.
* Upgrading equipment which has shown chronic patterns of
failure in the past.
The following plant modifications may be made to minimize the
potential for tube degradation in steam generators due to
corrosion in the future (Nutwell, 1983):
* Retubing and replacement of existing feedwater heaters and
moisture-separator/reheaters to eliminate sources of
copper-bearing materials in heat exchangers, which have
contributed to tube denting.
* Replacement of copper/nickel and aluminum alloy tubes in
the existing condensers with titanium tubes.
* Installation of wet-layup systems to provide mixing and to
maintain water quality in steam generators and in the
condensate and feedwater systems during extended plant
shutdowns.
* Addition of a full-flow condensate polisher
to ensure supply of high-purity water to steam
generators.
* Installation of a recirculation system to provide
a closed loop between the feedwater system and
the condenser for wet layup and flushing of the secondary
system.
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* Installation of a demineralized water storage system
to provide high quality water to the steam generators
for use during scheduled shutdown, startup, and
hot-stand by operations.
* The performance of the majority of safety-related equipment is
not significantly degraded by aging. There are some materials
utilized in safety-related equipment that deteriorate over
time, whichcauses performance changes (Bader, 1982).
* Only organic materials in instrumentation and control equipmen
are analyzed individually for aging effects.
* Aging encompasses chemical and physical changes that are
influenced by:
* temperature · composition of environment
* electrical stresses (including oxygen, moisture
mechanical stresses and corrosion components)
t
* To manage nuclear power
suggested that looks at
topics (Bader, 1982):
* nuclear radiation
plant aging a systems approach is
the problem by addressing the following
* process control * in-service inspection and
* reliability analysis maintenance
* acceptance tests * failed equipment
and control of spares * data collection
* material behavior
* During qualification testing limitations of materials due to
aging are commonly noted. These limitations necessitate
maintainence and surveillance activities in the plant to
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provide assurance that aging effects do not become significant.
Additional important conclusions are the following:
* All structural components have been designed conservatively and
are least susceptible to age-related degradation.
* Operating mechanical and thermal stress levels for mechanical
equipment are lower than those used as a design basis.
* It must be determined if there is a need for documentation of
actual mechanical and thermal cycles at nuclear power plants to
compare with original desing in order to assure extended life
feasibility.
* The qualified life of an equipment may be extended if it can be
shown that the service or environmental conditions originally
assumed were overly conservative with respect to those that
apply at the equipment's location in its installed
configuration.
* Of the abnormal operating events reported in 1969 through 1982
that had age-related causes, almost half of the events resulted
from instrument drift. The remaining events were attributed to
other age-related causes such as wear, corrosion, crud
deposition and fatigue.
10.3 Unanswered Questions
The development of a methodology for planning for plant aging and
life extensions requires identification of the answers to the following
important unanswered questions.
* What are the basic mechanisms of material degradation due to
aging? What factors influence the aging process?
* How can the actual aging phenomena be simulated in a
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qualification program to produce the same amount of degradation
in the equipment as it would actually experience?
* Which safety-related equipment should be monitored for
degradation? Can existing surveillance procedures for
degradation monitoring be used? What monitoring procedures
require further development?
* What must be done to establish qualified life when no practical
acceleration model exists for aging stresses other than thermal
stresses?
* Which areas in the plant cannot be tested by non-destructive
evaluation techniques?
* What modifications in operating practices are required for life
extension?
* What design modifications can be made to extend plant life?
* What components and structures would require repair or
replacement for plant life extension?
* Are all components and structures that are subject to
age-related degradation capable of being repaired or replaced?
* In the absence of explicit age-related design limits, what can
the utility do to respect such limits? What tests should be
conducted and what data should be gathered? How can the
utility estimate the status of the plant relative to its design
limits?
* What are the information requirements for a systematic approach
to identify age-related problem areas in the plant?
* What additional technical requirements would be necessary to
assure the capability of safety-related systems/components to
perform their intended safety functions?
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* What are the fatigue limits of control rod drives, thermal
sleeves, turbo-generator shafts and rotors, and reactor coolant
pump shafts?
* What is the source of the component cycle and transient limits
in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (Table
5.1)?
* Are there any areas in the plant where corrosion has not
occurred yet, but is anticipated?
* Is it possible to correlate corrosion rates with water
chemistry or operating history for the plant?
* How quickly is the life of a component being used up? What
techniques and tools are needed for determining the remaining
life of plant components?
What improved analysis and evaluation techniques are needed to
diagnose and correct problems in critical plant components?
10.4 Recommendations
A utility interested in nuclear plant life-extension should
consider taking the actions listed in Table 10.1.
Discussion
Some items requiring further discussion are listed below:
Item 1. Design information, especially design limits and basis,
from equipment vendors would help utilities understand
how age was considered in the design of equipment. This
information is important for assessing the status of the
plant. Even though in most cases this information
appears not to be readily available, utilities would
benefit from obtaining all the information that they can
get from the vendors of equipment.
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Item 2. Reactor vessel damage, from the effects of neutron
irradiation, may be reduced by changing fuel loading
designs. This is very important in view of the doubts
regarding the effectiveness of in-place annealing of the
vessel to restore the ductility of the vessel material.
Item 4. To detect age-related degradation, condition monitoring
techniques may be used along with existing maintenance
and surveillance practices. These techniques may be
applied to heavy rotating equipment such as turbine
generators to detect bearing wear. Condition monitoring
relies on measuring a number of relevant parameters and
plotting the results in order to observe a trend in the
degradation of critical components in the equipment.
-Item 5. Often, the operating history of equipment can be useful
in identifying age-related degradation and when a
component must be replaced. The utility can establish
programs to review surveillance and maintenance records
to critical plant equipment, including those of pressure
boundary components and safety-related equipment. The
aim is to discover when critical equipment will pose a
problem for the continued safe and efficient operation of
the plant.
Item 8. A review of the description of components, such as piping
and instrumentation, may indicate outdated parts and
materials of composition which are susceptible to
age-related degradation. New and improved equipment may
be installed to replace these aged equipment.
10-9
Item 12. Additional instrumentation may be installed near critical
plant components such as the steam generators,
pressurizer, turbines, pumps and valves to give
information about the operating conditions and the
environmental stresses afecting these equipment. This
information is important for the utility in order to
determine age-related design limits, as well as for early
identification of system degradation.
The remaining items in the Table indicate the importance of
monitoring critical equipment in the plant in order to prevent early
failures, of early planning of plant changes to prepare for major
component replacements and repairs and of steps to minimize steam
generator corrosion and to restore the ductility of the pressure
vessel. These action items are essential for extending the longevity
of the plant.
Finally, it is important to note that these steps might not be
enough to assure successful life-extension. With the uncertainties
involved in predicting and preventing component failures due to the
aging of the plant, utilities will have to do more than they have done
in the past to maintain operability of all equipment. In particular,
safety-related equipment must be subject to closer scrutiny because of
the likely concern of regulatory agencies with the safety of the
plant. But, with concentrated efforts to determine the effects of
aging on the functional capability of all systems and to identify means
to mitigate the aging process, utilities can eventually commit
themselves to the life extension of their nuclear plants.
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TABLE 10. I1
Utility Actions to Extend Plant Life
Obtain all available design
information from equipment
vendors, especially design
limits and basis.
Change fuel loading designs
for the reactor vessel.
Reduce the number of thermal
and mechanical cycles at the
plant.
Improve maintenance and
surveillance practices for
all equipment, particularly
for cables, insulation,
instrumentation and pressure
boundary components.
Establish continual programs
to review surveillance and
maintenance records of pressure
boundary components and safety-
related equipment.
Require considerations of
specific aging characteristics
of component material in component
maintenance and replacement schedules.
Evaluate the effects of flow-
induced vibration on reactor
internals.
Review the description and
drawings of plant control
wiring, piping, and
instrumentation.
To determine how age was
a consideration in the
design of equipment.
To minimize reactor vessel
damage from neutron
irradiation.
To prevent thermal and
mechanical fatigue of the
pressure boundary.
To help detect and mitigate
age-related degradation.
To assure that critical
equipment exhibiting age-
related degradation will be
identified and replace as
necessary.
To use components with
materials that have long-
life characteristics.
For early detection of
damage to reactor internals.
To identify aging or out-
dated parts for possible
charge or replacement.
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Utility Action Objective
Utility Action
Monitor the effects of
vibration on heavy rotating
equipment such as turbine
generators.
Review the operator's log,
surveillance procedures, testing
procedures and preventive
maintenance practices.
Identify alternative suppliers
for spare parts for equipment
which might not be available
from the vendor when the equipment
must be replaced.
Install additional instrumentation
near pressure boundary components
(i.e., instruments to measure
stresses on these components).
Collect focused plant operational
data, such as number of thermal and
mechanical cycles, from existing
instrumentation.
Replace copper/nickel and aluminum
alloy tubes in existing condensers
with titanium tubes.
Analyze the load-carrying
capabilities of the equipment-
hatch barrel, identify equipment
to be removed and evaluate the
existing structural steel
for new loads imposed by
temporary equipment.
Carefully plan construction
activities for repairs or
replacements in high radiation
fields.
To detect bearing wear.
To collect aging effects
data from the plant.
To assure availability of
spare parts when needed.
To provide early identifi-
cation of system degrada-
tion.
To help identify age-
related design limits of
critical equipment.
To minimize the potential
for PWR steam-generator tube
degradation in the future.
To prepare the plant for
major component replacements
and repairs.
To ensure that radiation
exposures to personnel
would be kept low.
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Objective
Utility Action
Inspect the thermal sleeves of
the pressurizer regularly by
nondestructive evaluation
techniques (e.g., using
x-radiation to detect surface
cracks).
Monitor for flange cracking
and vibration effects at support
points of turbine upper and lower
casings.
Monitor nuclear safety class
main steam piping and valve bodies
for erosion.
Investigate the feasibility of
in-place annealing of the
reactor pressure vessel.
Monitor the generator rotor
shaft for the effects of load
cycles and vibrations.
Inspect cables and insulations
made of polymeric materials.
Monitor the foundations of heavy
equipment connected to hot piping
systems (e.g., heaters, heat
exchangers, and condensers).
To prevent fatigue failure
due to thermal cycling.
To prevent turbine failure.
To maintain pressure
boundary integrity.
To ensure the success of
repairing the damage caused
by neutron irradiation on
pressure vessel steels.
To prevent generator
failure.
To detect thermal degrada-
tion.
To detect the effects of
fluctuating thermal loads.
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